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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE 1994-95 TERM
Elliot M. Mincberg*
I. Introduction
Even as the Supreme Court dealt with "hot button" issues during
the 1994-95 term-ranging from term limits to affirmative action-the
Court's docket continued to include a number of important First
Amendment cases. In fact, several of the Court's First Amendment
decisions also affected "hot button" issues, particularly the decisions
concerning church-state issues, which were decided against a backdrop
of demands by right-wing advocates for a constitutional amendment on
Legal Director, People for the American Way, Washington, D.C.; J.D. 1977, Harvard
University;B.A. 1974, Northwestern University. The author and People for the American
Way gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Chris Edelman and Eunice Lee, summer
legal interns at People for the American Way in 1995, without whose work this Article
would not have been possible.
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religion.'
Both of the Supreme Court's church-state decisions,
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia2 and Capitol Square Review and
Advisory Board v. Pinette,3 raised important free expression questions.
Ruling that the state could not prevent the Ku Klux Klan from erecting
a cross on a public square in Pinette,4 and in Rosenberger,5 that a state
university could not deny student activity funds to a student religious
magazine when non-religiousactivities are funded, the Court arguably
heartened free expression advocates while disappointing advocates of
strict church-state separation. The latter group, however, may find a
silver lining in the Court's rulings.6 Observers noted that the decisions
may have taken some of the wind out of the sails of those who support
'The proposed "Religious Equality Amendment" reads: "Neither the United States nor
any state shall deny benefits to or otherwise discriminate against any private person or
group on account of religious expression, belief or identity; nor shall the prohibition of
laws respecting establishment of religion be construed to require such discrimination."
Henry J. Hyde, Speaking Outfor a Religious EqualityAmendmen4 CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 1996,
at N2 1; cf Esther Diskin, Prayer Amendment Stirs Passion, Protest; Conservative Groups
Love the Idea, But Others Shudder, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, May 30, 1995, at A I (criticizing
the recent popularity of the "Religious Equality Amendment" as "roll[ing] back decades of
United States Supreme Court rulings on the separation of church and state").
2 Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
3 Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
4 In Pinette, the Court found that the Ku Klux Klan placing a non-attended cross, which
is a purely private action, in a designated public forum, does not violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment because the public forum is open to all on equal terms and
the public will not be misconceived that the state supports a certain religion. Pinette, 115
S. Ct. at 2450.
5 In Rosenberger, the Court held that a public university is not required to deny funding
to religious-basedstudent publicationsto side-step EstablishmentClause violations because
interpreting each publication for religious beliefs would violate the Speech Clause of the
First Amendment. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2524-25.
6 See David Savage, High Court Ends Term; Court Callsfor "Neutral" Approach to
Religion Issues, Judiciary: In Two Cases, Justices Reject Bias Against Expressions of Faith
as a Double Standard. Advocates of Church-State Separation Decry Ruling, L. A: TIMES,
June 30, 1995, at A21 (describingthe Supreme Court's rulings in Rosenberger and Pinette
as "important victories" for religious-rights activists).
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a constitutional amendment; it becomes harder to argue that the courts
are "hostile" to religion and that an amendment is necessary in light of
decisions like Rosenberger and Pinette.7 In addition, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor provided the pivotal fifth, vote in both decisions,' and made
clear that she will continue to review such difficult church-state issues
on a case-by-case basisf Indeed, Justice O'Connor refused to adopt the
more sweeping proposals to limit or overturn established church-state
principles advocated by Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia."°
The Court's other First Amendment decisions in 1994-95
generally protected freedom of expression." Setting aside Rosenberger
and Pinette, the Court directly considered the validity of government
See id. (observing that "[a]dvocates of church-state separation faulted the [C]ourt for
knocking down a once solid barrier" that public money could not be used to promote
religious beliefs).
. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525; .Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 245 1. Justice O'Connor did
not join in either majority opinion, but wrote her own concurring opinions. See generally
id.
9 Justice O'Connor noted that in cases where "two bedrock principles so conflict," in this
case, "government neutrality and the prohibition of state funding of religious activities," the
cases must be decided based on the facts of each case. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525-26.
0 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2456-57.
"See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. PassengerCorp., 115 S. Ct. 961,974 (1995)(noting that
Amtrak's refusal to display political billboards may not violate the First Amendment by
holding that Government corporations created for the furtherance of governmental
objectives are considered part of the government for First Amendment'purposes); United
States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1018-19 (1995) (holding that
section 501 (b) of the Ethics in Governmert Act of 1978, as amended to prohibit a member
of Congress, federal officer, or other government employee from accepting an honorarium
for making an appearance, speech, or writing an article, violates the First Amendment);
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1524 (1995) (holding that Ohio's
statutory prohibition against distribution of anonymous campaign literature does not violate
the First Amendment); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1594 (1995) (holding
that section 5(e)(2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, as amended by 27 U.S.C.
section 205(e)(2), which prohibits the displaying of alcohol content on beer labels, violates
the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2343 (1995) (holding that "the
requirement to admit a parade contingent, expressing a message not of the private
organizers' own choosing, violates the First Amendment").
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restrictionson freedom of expression in six other cases.12 In all but one
of its rulings, which concerned a Florida restriction on solicitation by
attorneys,' 3 the' Court ruled in favor of free expression. 4 The five
decisions included instances where the Court overturned federal or state
statutes, and reflected a fair degree of consensus on the Court;'" a total
of only six full or partial dissenting votes were cast in all five cases,' 6
two of which were unanimous. 7
An examination of the voting patterns of the Justices in the seven
cases focusing directly on free expression and church-state issues during
1994-95 also yields interesting results. Only Justice O'Connor voted
2 Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 961; Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1003; McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at
1551; Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1585; Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2338; Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., 1 15 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (holding that the Florida Bar's prohibition on personal injury
attorneys from soliciting victims and their families within thirty days of a disaster does not
violate the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech).
'3 Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2371.
" Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 961; Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1003; McIntyre, 115 S. Ct.
at 1511; Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1585; Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2338; Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at
2371.
'" See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 961 (considering the First Amendment ramifications of 49
U.S.C. § 10901 and 10903, which created Amtrak); Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1003
(considering Ethics in Governmental Act of 1978 § 501 (b) which prohibits receipt of
honoraria by government employees); McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1511 (considering OHIO
REV. CODE § 3599.09(A)which prohibits distribution of anonymous campaign literature);
Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1585 (considering 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2), which prohibits beer labels
from displaying alcohol coritent); Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2338 (considering a Massachusetts
statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANrN. ch. 272 § 98, which prohibits discrimination based on
sexual orientation in the admission of people to public accommodations).
6 See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 961 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct.
at 1003 (Scalia and Thomas, J.J., and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, and O'Connor, J.,
dissentingin part); McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1511 (Scalia, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting);
Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1594-97 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" See Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1585; Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2338. For a discussion of the
three other decisions that involved First Amendment issues more directly, such as in the
context of statutory construction, see infra notes 508 to 560, and accompanying text.
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with the majority in all seven cases, 8 reflecting her pivotal role on the
current Court in a number of areas, specifically including Establishment
Clause issues. Two sets of justices voted with each other in all seven
cases. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, who are
popularly regarded as among the more "conservative" justices on the
Court, voted identically in each case. 9 On the other hand, from among
the more "progressive" justices, Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg voted the same way in all seven cases, although
occasionally issuing separate concurring opinions0
This article will review each of the Court's First Amendment-
related decisions during the 1994-95 term. These decisions concern both
Establishment Clause and free expression issues.
II. The Establishment Clause
A. Rosenberger v. University of Virginia
In Rosenbergerv. Universityof Virginid, the Court held five to
four that the University of Virginia could not justify the denial of
reimbursement from a student activities fund to a student paper
expressing a proselytizing religious viewpoint under the Establishment
Clause.22 In many ways, the opinion had more to do with government
8 In Nat'l Treasury, Justice O'Connor filed an opinion partially concurring in and
partially dissenting from the majority's ruling. 115 S. Ct. at 1019-24.
'
9 See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 961; Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1003; Mclntyre, 115 S.
Ct. at 1511; Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1585; Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2338; Rosenberger, 115 S.
Ct. at 2513; Pinette, 115 S. Ct, at 2440.
21 See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 961; Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1003; McIntyre, 115 S.
Ct. at 1524-25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1594-97 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2338; Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2533; Pinette, 115 S.
Ct. at 2464.
21 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
22 Id. at 2510.
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restrictions on free speech than with government establishment of
religion; the Court devoted only about four and one-half pages of its
twenty-five page opinion to Establishment Clause analysis, noting that
the University "seems to have abandoned" the Establishment Clause
argument at the Supreme Court level. 23 The majority focused on free-
speech principles,24 pointing out that it was not confronted with a fact
scenario involving the expenditure of tax monies for direct religious
benefit,25 and noting that its holding with respect to government aid to
religion was limited to the specific facts of the case. 26 Nevertheless, the
opinion has important implications for both free speech and
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
In 1990, Rosenberger founded Wide Awake Productions, 27 an
organization designed to "publish a magazine of philosophical and
religious expression . . . [t]o facilitate discussion which fosters an
atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints," and
"[tio provide a unifying focus for Christians of multicultural
backgrounds" at the University of Virginia,, At that time, the University
allowed all "Contracted Independent Organizations" ("CIO") to exist and
have access to University facilities, and allowed some to receive funding
from the Student Activities Fund ("SAF"). 9 The SAF drew its money
23 Id. at 2520-2 1.
2 4 Id. at 2516-20.
25 Id. at 2522.
26 See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523 (noting that the majority opinion takes into
account the specific facts of the case which the Court of Appeals and the dissent both failed
to do).
27 Id. at 2515.
28 Id. (citing Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 67).
29 Id. at 2514 (citing Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 2a). "CIO status is available
to any group the majority of whose members are students, whose managing officers are full-
time students, and that complies with certain procedural requirements." Id. (citations
omitted).
A CIO must file its constitution with the
University; must pledge not to discriminate in its
membership; and must include in dealings with
1997] SUPREME COURT: 1994-95 TERM
from a mandatory student fee of fourteen dollars per semester charged
to each full-time student.0 The Student Council was authorized to
disburse SAF monies, subject to review by a faculty body." SAF money
was not used to make payments directly to student groups.32 If a CIO
received funding from SAF, the CIO submitted bills to the Student
Council, which would pay the CIO's creditors.,, At the time that
Rosenberger's group gained CIO status, University guidelines excluded
certain activities from SAF support, including "religious activities." ' 4 A
religious activity was defined as an activity that "primarily promotes or
manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or ultimate reality.""
Wide Awake qualified as a CIO,6 which the Court noted "is an
important consideration in this case ...for had it been a 'religious
organization,' [Wide Awake] would not have been accorded CIO
status.""v Wide Awake requested that the SAF pay its printer for the
costs of printing its newspaper.,, The Student Council denied the
request, describing Wide Awake's newspaper as a "religious activity
under the University's guidelines."",
Wide Awake exhausted the appeals available at the University,4'
third parties and in all written materials a
disclaimer, stating that the CIO is independent of
the University and that the University is not
responsible for the CIO. (Citations omitted). Id.
30Id. at 2514.




34 Id. at 2514-15.
3 1Id. at 2515.
36 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct at 2514-15.
31 Id. The Court later pointed out that "[wie do not confront a case where, even under
a neutral program that includes nonsectarian recipients, the government is making direct
money payments to an institutionor group that is engaged in religious activity." Id. at 2523.
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and filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia:' Wide Awake challenged the University's denial of funds,
which it claimed was made solely on the basis of Wide Awake's
religious viewpoint, as violating the rights of its members and editors to
freedom of speech and press, equal protection, and the free exercise of
religion.12 The District Court ruled for the University,4" holding that
although the First Amendment protected the University as a public
institution, the University had not engaged in impermissible content or
viewpoint-based discrimination.4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
disagreed,41 holding that the University's guidelines did discriminate on
the basis of content.46 However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court'sjudgment; 7 finding that the compelling interest in strictly
separating church and state justified the content-based discrimination.48
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and reversed.49
The majority opinion began by analyzing the University's
guidelines prohibiting SAF reimbursement for religious activities as
government viewpoint-based discrimination against speech that
placed a financial burden on religious speakers based on the content
of their speechY° The Court found that the University had set up a
forum and stated that "[o]nce it has opened a limited forum... the
State... may not... discriminate against speech on the basis of its
41 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515-16.
41Id. at 2516.
4' 795 F. Supp. 175, 183-84 (W.D. Va. 1992).
44Id. at 178-83.
45 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994).
46 Id. at 280-81.
41 Id. at 287-88.
41 Id. at 287.
49 See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2510-33.
50 Id. at 2516-20.
230 [Vol. XIII
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viewpoint.", The majority explained that the University may only
exclude speakers from its forum based on "reasonable [distinctions
made] in light of the purpose served by the forum."" The majority
stated that with respect to exclusions from a limited public forum,
"content discrimination may . . . be permissible if it preserves the
purposes of that limited forum, [but] most viewpoint discrimination is
... impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the
forum's limitations.'13 The question thus became whether the exclusion
of Wide Awake was based on content or viewpoint.
The majority admitted that the distinction between content-based
and viewpoint-baseddiscrimination "is not a precise one. '54 The Court
concluded that viewpoint discrimination is the proper way to view Wide
Awake because the University "select[ed] for disfavored treatment those
student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints."" The
Court found that the University engaged in impermissible viewpoint
discrimination because its guidelines on religion singled out a
"prohibited perspective, not the general subject matter [of religion]. 's6
It was not the subject matter Wide Awake chose for discussion that led
to denial of University of funds, the majority maintained, but Wide
Awake's viewpoint as applied to that subject matter." Although this case
happened to involve discrimination against speech with a religious
viewpoint, the majority suggested it should be treated as if
discrimination against a political, economic, or social viewpoint were




14 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
"5 Id. However, the SAF guidelines did not "exclude religion as subject matter." Id.
56 id.
17 Id. at 2517-18. This conclusion is premised on the fact that the subject areas discussed
were within the proper standards. Id.
231
232 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
involved.8
The majority relied heavily on recent decisions involving access
for religious speakers to limited public fora, particularly Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist. ,9 even though the Court
admitted that "[t]he SAF is a forum more in a metaphysical than in a
spatial or geographic sense."60  In Lamb's Chapel, the Court held
unanimously that "it is discrimination on the basis of viewpoint to
permit school property to be used for the presentation of all views about
family issues and child-rearing except those dealing with the subject
matter from a religious standpoint."6 In that case, a church group
"desiring to show a film series addressing various child-rearing
questions from a 'Christian perspective"' had been denied access to
school facilities that were open to a wide variety of other groups for use
after school hours.62 The Court compared the denial of funding to Wide
Awake Productions with the denial of access to the church group in
Lamb's Chapel, concluding that an analogous result was appropriate
here: a finding of viewpoint-based discrimination by the University. 63
One particular aspect of Rosenberger will be heartening to free
expression advocates. The Court suggested that its decision upholding
"Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518. "It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and
an atheistic perspective on the debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet another
political, economic, or social Viewpoint." Id.
59 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
60 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
61 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393.
62 Id. at 387-89. The Church of Lamb's Chapel twice applied to the defendant school
district for permission to use school facilities to show a six-part film series containing
lectures by Doctor James Dobson, a psychologistand best selling author, and twice rejected
by the school district board for the film "appears to be church related." Id.
13 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518 ("The University's denial of [Wide Awake
Production's] request for third-party payments in the present case is based upon viewpoint
discriminationnot unlike the discriminationthe school district relied upon in Lamb's Chapel
and that we found invalid.").
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the abortion "gag rule" in Rust v. Sullivan6 does not apply to all
government funded expression, drawing a line between private speech
funded by the government and government speech .6  When the
government is facilitating speech by private persons, the Court indicated,
it may not discriminate based on viewpoint.66  This has positive
implications for artists, scholars, and others who receive government
funding, because after Rosenberger, the government should be
prohibited from "silenc[ing] the expression of selected viewpoints" when
it provides a forum for free expression.67
Other parts of the majority's opinion may operate to limit its
scope with respect to free speech. The majority was particularly
troubled by the idea of state censorship of speech in the university
setting.61 It worried that the University's guideline would "cast
disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students [and] risks the
suppressionof free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers
for the nation's intellectual life, its college and university campuses. 69
The Court has signalled that the same concerns might not apply to
younger schoolchildren.', It is possible that in the elementary or high
- 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding the government's prohibition on abortion-related
advice applicable to recipients of federal funds for family planning counseling).
65 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518-19.
66 ld.
67 Id. at 2519 ("Having offered to pay the third party contractors on behalf of private
speakers who convey their own messages, the University may not silence the expression of
selected viewpoints.").
61 Id. at 2520 (noting that First Amendment speech principles are especially at stake in
a university setting where "the State acts against a background and tradition of thought and
experiment that is the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition").
69 id.
70 See Vernonia Sch. Dist.. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2390 (1995) (noting that "while
children assuredly do not 'shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate,' the
nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school") (citing Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)); see also Hazelwood
Sch. Dist.. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (noting that public school authorities
may censor school-sponsored publications, so long as the censorship is reasonably related
to legitimate educational concerns).
233
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school setting the Court might find the interest in robust and uninhibited
debate outweighed by the state's custodial and educational duty and
authority with respect to children placed in its custody by compulsory
education laws.,,
In addition, the decision also suggested that the state could and
should exercise more control over religious speech when that speech
might constitute a state endorsement of religion!2 The University relied
on the Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent73 in making the argument
that it must have substantial discretion in determining how to spend
scarce resources.74 The Court acknowledged that Widmar allows the
government to regulate the content of speech when the government is
the speaker,75 but that aspect of Widmar was found inapplicable here
because the University was clearly not the speaker.76 Having dismissed
the University's right to regulate speech content as irrelevant in a
situation where the University is not the speaker, the Court could find no
rationale for the University's regulation other than the illegitimate
restriction of private speech.77 But the Court's discussion implies that the
government could regulate religious content in the public elementary
' See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist.. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding public
high school's disciplinary action to prohibit student from using obscene and profane speech
self-governmentelectioncampaignsnot violativeof the First Amendment). In reaching its
decision in favor of the school district, the Court reasoned that "[tlhe undoubted freedom
to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced
against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior." Id. at 681.
72 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518 ("[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make
content-based choices.... [W]e have permitted the government to regulate the content of
what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey
its own message.").
73454 U.S. 263 (1981).
74 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518.
"Id. at 2519 ("We recognized that when the government appropriates public funds to
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to what it wishes.").
76 Id.
" Id. at 2520.
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and high schools, where student perception of government endorsement
is more of an issue, and where government cannot disclaim
responsibility for students placed in its charge by compulsory education
laws.7s In fact, Justice Scalia has recently announced in another case
that "the nature of [the State's power over schoolchildren] is custodial
and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that could
not be exercised over free adults. 79
In turning to the question of whether paying a third party for the
cost of Wide Awake's publication would violate the Establishment
Clause in this case, the Court majority applied what it termed a
"neutrality" standard!' The majority articulated the standard extremely
broadly, suggesting that neutrality is "respected" when government,
following "neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to
recipientswhose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are
broad and diverse."'" However, in applying the requirement of
government neutrality to the facts of the case, the Court pointed to a
number of specific factors suggesting a more narrow definition of
neutrality for purposes of government funding of religious activities.8 2
In particular, the Court pointed to a number of factors as
important in finding that funding here would not violate government
neutrality toward religion. 3 These included the facts that: (1) the
money involved here was a student fee, and did not come from a general
tax fund; (2) the money from the SAF was targeted to support specific
and limited student activities; (3) Wide Awake was not a religious or
sectarian institution since it qualified as a CIO; (4) no money was to be
7s See supra note 71, and accompanying text.
7 Vernonia Sch. Dist.., 115 S. Ct. at 2523.
0 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523 ("We have held that the guarantee of neutrality is
respected, not offended, when the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded
policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious
ones, are broad and diverse.").
S Id.
12 Id. at 2522-24.
s3 Id.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
paid directly to Wide Awake, since the SAF reimburses third party
contractors (Wide Awake's printer); (5) the benefit to religion was
indirect; (6) there was no government intent to advance religion; (7)
there was no endorsement problem because the private, SAF-funded
speech could not reasonably be understood to be government endorsed;
and (8) there was no government entanglement with religion, since the
University paid third party contractors and remained disengaged from
Wide Awake's publication. 4
In providing the crucial fifth vote in favor of Wide Awake,
Justice O'Connor further emphasized the narrow, fact-specific nature of
the result in Rosenberger.85 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
portrayed a tension between "two bedrock principles" of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence: government neutrality toward religion and the
prohibition against state funding of religious activities.86 Where the
Court majority generally suggested that a general guiding principle of
"neutrality" toward religion may be less important than specific facts in
deciding individual cases,87 Justice O'Connor made explicit the need for
case-by-case analysis in this uncertain area of the law.88
In this case, Justice O'Connor found many of the same factors
important that the Court majority emphasized, such as: (1) the fact that
student fees, not tax monies were involved; (2) the fact that student
organizations remain strictly independent of the University; (3) the fact
that funds are paid directly to the third party vendor and do not even
pass through the student group; and (4) the fact that there was no
endorsement problem here and religious speech did not threaten to
"dominate the forum."89
14 Id. at'2524.
g Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525.
I ld. at 2525.
$ Id. at 2521 (stating that "we must in each case inquire into the purpose and object of
the governmental action in question.. .. Before turning to the matter, however, we can set
forth certain general principles that must bear upon our determination").
8 Id. at 2526.
89 Id. at 2526-27.
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Justice O'Connor clearly stated that Rosenberger did not
generally resolve the question of government funding of sectarian
institutions or programs, and did not signal "the demise of the funding
prohibition in Establishment Clause jurisprudence." 9° Those who have
confidently predicted that Rosenberger means that the Court will
inevitably approve religious school voucher programs, therefore, are at
best premature.9 At present, Justice O'Connor would appear to hold a
decisive vote in such a case and for Justice O'Connor, the resolution of
future cases under the Establishment Clause will involve "careful
judgment and fine distinctions. "92
Justice Thomas' concurring opinion, by contrast, shows that he
is ready to dramatically depart from existing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. 93 Justice Thomas' radical reading of the Establishment
Clause is that "the Framers saw the Establishment Clause simply as a
prohibition on governmental preferences for some religious faiths over
others." '94 Under Justice Thomas' interpretation, the Establishment
Clause would apparently permit direct government funding of religious
institutions, including schools.95 Justice Thomas relied on "historical
evidence of governmental [funding] support for religious entities," '96
concluding that once the Court allowed indirect aid to religion it could
not justify drawing a line between permissible indirect aid, e.g. police
90 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2528.
9' See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen,A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited
Public Forum: UnconstitutionalConditions on "Equal Access"for Religious Speakers and
Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 652, 712 (1996) (proposing that "it should be abundantly
clear after Rosenberger that inclusion of religious schools in voucher plans is at least
constitutionally permissible"); see generally Parades, Public Squares and Voucher
Payments: Problems of Governmental Neutrality, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 243, 247 (1996)
(discussing the view that Rosenberger may foreshadow the constitutionality of religious
school voucher programs).
92 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526.
9 Id. at 2528-33 (Thomas, J., concurring).
14 Id. at 2529 (Thomas, J., concurring).
9 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
96 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2531.
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and fire protection, and impermissible direct funding of religion.97
While Justice Thomas argued that the EstablishmentClause does
not distinguish between police protection and direct funding of
religion,9" Justice Souter's dissent identified "the direct support of
religious activity" with public money as "the heart of the prohibition on
establishment," based -on historical evidence and Supreme Court
precedent.99 As the Court ruled in Everson v' Board of Education:
The 'establishmentof religion' clause of
the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another.... No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or
institutions....'0 (Emphasis added).
Justice Souter defined the Court's opinion not as a traditional
defense of free speech, but as an unprecedented approval of state
funding of religious activity." 2 The Court failed to take full account of
97 Id. at 2532-33.
" Id. at 2532 (Thomas, J., concurring)(reasoning that the same result would be obtained
whether a church was reimbursed for smoke detectors, or whether a fire department is
established).
99Id. at 2532-33 (Souter, J., dissenting) (Justice Souter was joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg and Breyer).
1- 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
'-lld. at 15.
102 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2533. "The Court today, for the first time, approves direct
funding of core religious activities by an arm of the state." Id.
238 [Vol. XIII
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the proselytizing, evangelical nature of Wide Awake publications, °3
Justice Souter explained, and failed to see that it was in fact approving
"direct subsidization of preaching the word."" 4 For the dissent, this was
a clear case of direct government financial aid to religion.10 5
In an attempt to bypass the Establishment Clause prohibition
against direct aid to religion, Justice Souter wrote, the Court
inappropriately placed this case in line with cases allowing access for
speakers with religious messages to limited open forums."0 6 Justice
Souter criticized the analogy for stretching the forum access cases
103 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2540.
The Court does not quote the magazine's adoption
of Saint Paul's exhortation to awaken to the
nearness of salvation, or any of its articles
enjoining readers to accept Jesus Christ, or the
religious verses, or the religious textual analyses,
or the suggested prayers. And so it is easy for the
Court to lose sight of what the University students
and the Court of Appeals found so obvious, and to
blanch the patently and frankly evangelistic
character of the magazine by unraveling allusions
to religious points of view. Id.
'04 Id. at 2535.
This writing [in Wide Awake's magazine] is no
merely descriptive examination of religious
doctrine or even of ideal Christian practice in
confronting life's social and personal problems...
. It is straightforward exhortation to enter into a
relationship with God as revealed in Jesus Christ,
and to satisfy a series of moral obligations derived
from the teachings of Jesus Christ. Id.
'05 Id. at 2539-40.
106 Id. at 2545-46. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), Board ofEd of Westside
Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226(1990) and Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) were cited to show that the regulations found
in the cases created a limited public forum for speakers but excluded speakers with religious
messages. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2545-46. The regulations were struck down in all
three cases because they were either content or viewpoint based. Id.
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beyond their limits. 7 He explained that those cases were linked to the
tradition of unimpeded "street corner speech" the idea that free speech
on the street corner deserves the highest constitutional protection.'
Justice Souter wrote that the street corner analogy broke down when
applied to permit reimbursementof printing expenses.'0 9 Justice Souter
also maintained that Rosenberger did not truly involve viewpoint
discrimination because the University denied funding to a subject
matter-religious advocacy, whether Christian, Jewish, Muslim, or
atheist-not a viewpoint." 0
Justice Souter vigorously contested the suggestion that direct
funding of religion is constitutional so long as it is part of a broad,
evenhanded government program."' He further argued that the Court
failed to separate various levels of inquiry under the Establishment
Clause, instead condensing all analysis under the vague touchstone of
neutrality."2 For cases "at the margins," for example "put[ting] out fires
in burning churches ... pay[ing] the bus fares of students on the way to
parochial schools," '13 Justice Souter agreed that the principle of
neutrality "may become important to ensuring that religious interests are
07 ld. at 2456.
o Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2456.
'
9 Id at 2546.
" Id. Justice Souter explained that in order for viewpoint discrimination to be present,
the government must allow one side of an issue and deny the opposing side. Id. Here, the
government denied funding for "the entire subject matter of religious apologetics." Id
.. Id. at 2539 (citing a common principle in many cases that the Establishment Clause
"absolutely prohibit[s] government-financed 
. . . indoctrination into the beliefs of a
particular religious faith").
2 Id. at 2540 (explainingthat the majority believed that the University's funding of the
magazine was "neutral" because it makes funds available for "secular and sectarian
applicants alike").
13 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2541 (questioning whether state involvement which gives
incidental benefit to religion is unconstitutional).
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not inhibited.", 4  The Court's error was to extend this principle of
neutrality beyond this "narrow band of cases" involving indirect aid to
suggest that direct aid to religion can be constitutional so long as it is
"neutral" and "evenhanded.""' 5
Justice Souter concluded that it was difficult to tell whether the
majority's opinion "portends much more than making a shambles out of
student activity fees in public colleges" or represents a more significant
"downhill thrust" with respect to church state law. 116 The answer to such
questions will have to await future cases involving such questions as
vouchers for religious schools and the potentially decisive vote, at least
on the current Court, of Justice O'Connor.
B. Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette
In Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette' the Court ruled 7-2
that the display of an unattended cross sponsored by the Ku Klux Klan,
amongst a variety of unattended displays near the Ohio statehouse did
not violate the Establishment Clause."' Capitol Square is a state-owned
plaza in Columbus, Ohio that has traditionally been used for public
speeches, gatherings and festivals and is open to the public under Ohio
law." 9  The Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board has
114 Id. at 2541. Justice Souter quoted Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 592 in stating how
evenhandedness becomes important when determining if "a law either 'advance[s] [or]
inhibit[s] religion."' Id.
"5Id. "Evenhandednessis... a prerequisiteto further inquiry into the constitutionality
of a doubtful law, but evenhandednessgoes no further. It does not guarantee success under
the Establishment Clause." Id.
116 Id. at 2551.
117 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
" Id. at 2450 (reasoning that "religious expression cannot violate the Establishment
Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public
forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms").
119 Id. at 2444.
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responsibility under Ohio law for regulating public access to the Square,
based on a content-neutral evaluation of a group's application for use of
the Square.' 2 The Board has a history of granting access to a broad
range of applicants, including gay rights organizations, the Ku Klux
Klan and the United Way.' 2' A variety of unattended displays had also
been permitted, including a United Way fundraising display, a state-
sponsored Christmas tree and a privately-sponsored menorah.'
22
The episode had been described as having "all the air of a very
contrived [law school] hypothetical."' 23 In November 1993, the Board
denied the application of the Ohio Ku Klux Klan to place an unattended
cross on the Square during the Christmas season.2 4 The Ku Klux Klan
sought, and was granted, an injunction in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which found that the Square was
a traditional public forum open to the public with no policy against
unattended displays.'2 5 The Court ruled that the Ku Klux Klan's cross
was private expression protected by the First Amendment and that
allowing the cross presented no problem of state endorsement of religion
under the EstablishmentClause. 26 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,127 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 28
Seven justices found no Establishment Clause violation and
"o Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2440 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 105.41 and OHIO ADMIN.
CODE § 128-4-02 (1994)).
121 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2440 (citing brief for petitioner).
122 id.
123 Henry J. Reske, Double Cross-Free Speech Surfaces Over Ku Klux Klan's Christmas
Display, 81 A.B.A. J. Apr. 1995, at 48.
124 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2445.
2 Pinette v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D. Ohio
1993).
126 Id.
27 Pinette v. Capitol Review and Advisory Bd., 30 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 1994).
28 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2440.
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allowed the cross..29 A plurality of four, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas would have adopted a per se rule
as suggested by the Sixth Circuit that there can never be an
"endorsement" or Establishment Clause violation when private religious
speech takes place in a public forum. 3 ° Three concurring Justices,
O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, declined to embrace the plurality's per se
approach and applied an "endorsement" approach to state policy
regarding private religious speech in a public forum, but found no
endorsement in Pinette.3' Two dissenters, Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, found an endorsement of religion based on their own version
of the "endorsement" standard. 132
The concurring Justices agreed in general with the plurality that
"[r]espondents' -religious display in Capitol Square was private
expression.., as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular
private expression. W133 This proposition prompted analysis of the Board's
denial of access to the Ku Klux Klan as a content-based restriction of
religious speech.' 34 The Board acknowledged that the display was
constitutionally protected expression but argued that the content-based
restriction of speech was justified by the state's interest in obeying the
commands of the Establishment Clause. 135
The Court acknowledged that "the State's interest in avoiding
official endorsement of Christianity," if implicated, would count as a
"state interest sufficiently compelling to justify content-based
restrictionson speech."'36 The plurality evaluated the Board's argument
under its interpretation of public forum doctrine and proffered a per se
129 Id.
130 Id. at 2450.
3' Id. at 2451 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2 Id. at 2464, 2474.
3 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2446.
114 Id. at 2446 (noting that states may regulate expressive content only if such a restriction
is necessary and narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest).
" Id. at 2446.
136 id.
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rule under which there can never be an endorsement violating the
Establishment Clause when "purely private" religious speech occurs in
a public forum "open to all on equal terms."'37 The concurring Justices
found that interest not implicated because there was: no such
endorsement in this case.'38
The plurality maintained that Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District39 and Widmar v. Vincent 40  were
controlling. 4' In those cases, the Court found that a school district and
a public university, respectively, could not exclude religious groups
from facilities that were open to a variety of other groups:' 9 The
plurality identified several key factors in those cases, including the fact
t17 Pinette, 15 S. Ct. at 2450.
' Id. at 2451 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
14o 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
141 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2446-47. "We have twice previously addressed the combination
of private religious expression, a forum available for public use, content-based regulation,
and a State's interest in complying with the Establishment Clause. Both times we have
struck down the restriction on religious content." Id. (Citing Lamb's Chapel v. Enter
Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1983)).
Quite obviously, the factors that we considered
determinativein Lamb's Chapel and Widmar exist
here as well. The state did not sponsor
respondents'expression, the expression was made
on government property that had been opened to
the public for speech, and permission was
requested through the same application process
and on the same terms required of other private
groups. Id.
'
42 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 396. "Districtproperty may be used for social, civic,
or recreational use 'only if it can be non-exclusive and open to all residents of the school
district that form a homogeneous group deemed relevant to the event."' Id See also
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. "The basis for our decision is narrow.. Having created a forum
generally open to student groups, the University seeks to enforce a content-based principle
that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the University is unable to
justify this violation under applicable constitutional standards." Id.
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that: (1) the school property was open to a wide variety of groups; (2)
the state was not directly sponsoringthe religious group's activities; and
(3) access to the forum provided only incidental benefits to religion.1 43
The plurality found the same mitigating factors with respect to the
Establishment Clause to be present in Pinette.
The- Board argued that there was an "endorsement" problem
distinguishing this case from Lamb's Chapel and Widmar, because the
square where the cross was to be displayed was in close proximity to the
Ohio statehouse.44 The Board maintained observers could well perceive
that the State was endorsing the cross and its message. 45 The plurality
141 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2446.
We rejected the district's compelling state-interest
Establishment Clause defense (the same made
here) because the school property was open to a
wide variety of uses, the district was not directly
sponsoringthe religious group's activity, and 'any
benefit to religion or to the church would have
been no more than incidental.' Id. (Citations
omitted).
144 Id. at 2447.
Petitioners argue that one feature of the present
case distinguishes it from Lamb's Chapel and
Widmar; the forum's proximity to the seat of
government,'which, they contend, may produce
the perception that the cross bears the State's
approval. They urge us to apply the so-called
'endorsement test' . . . and to find that, because an
observer might mistake private expression for
officially endorsed religious expression, the State's
content-based restriction is constitutional. Id.
141 Id. at 2447. The plurality suggested however, that although an observer's subjective
interpretation of government endorsement is irrelevant, relevance such as to warrant an
"endorsement test" as urged by petitioners might be invoked when the test's subject was
either expression by the government itself. . . or else government action alleged to
discriminate in favor of private religious expression or activity." Id. (Emphasis added).
In the case at hand, the Court declined to apply what it deemed "the so-called
'endorsement test' on grounds that "our cases have accordingly equated 'endorsement' with
'promotion' or 'favoritism' and stated that:
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specifically rejected the use of the endorsement test in this context,
maintaining that unconstitutional endorsement cannot occur when
"private speech [is] mistaken for government speech . . . [and] the
government has not fostered or encouraged the mistake."' 46
According to the plurality, there can never be state endorsement
of religion given an open forum and private sponsorship of religious
activity, and that applying the endorsementtest in such a context would
"exil[e] private religious speech to a realm of less-protected expression
heretofore inhabited only by sexually explicit displays and commercial
speech."' 47
The concurrences of Justices O'Connor and Souter, each joined
by Justice Breyer, applied the endorsement test that the plurality
We find it peculiar to say that government
'promotes'or'favors' a religious display by giving
it the same access to a public forum that all other
displays enjoy.... [Als a matter of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, we have consistently held
that it is no violation for government to enact
neutral policies that happen to benefit religion. Id.
Justice Thomas thought that this case may not have truly involved the
Establishment Clause because the Ku Klux Klan had a "primarily nonreligious purpose,"
and that '[t]he erection of such a cross is a political act, not a Christian one." Id. at 2450.
This is a potentially troubling suggestion: if a traditionally religious symbol used for
political purposes can thus escape Establishmert Clause scrutiny, a serious question would
be raised as to whether any and all religious speech could escape Establishment Clause
scrutiny if the speaker claimed a political purpose. See id. at 2451.
146 Id. at 2448-49. "There is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect" (quoting Board of Ed. of
Westside Community Schools, 496 U.S. at 250 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). "The distinction
disappears whenever private speech can be mistaken for government speech. That
proposition cannot be accepted, at least where, as here, the government has not fostered or
encouraged the mistake." Id.
147 Id. at 2448.
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shunned.141 Justice O'Connor rejected the plurality's attempt "to carve
out ...an exception to the endorsement test for the public forum
context."'49  She also rejected the plurality's assertion that private
religious speech can never constitute a government endorsement of
religion. 5 Her version of the endorsement test asks "whether the
challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of
'endorsing' religion" in the perception of an idealized "reasonable,
informed observer."'' Justice O'Connor wrote that without such an
endorsement test, the Establishment Clause would be stripped of its
power to prohibit "the sending of a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
' Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2456. "To be sure the endorsement test depends on a sensitivity
to the unique circumstancesand context of a particular challenged practice and, like any test
that is sensitive to context, it may not always yield results with unanimous agreement at the
margins" (quoting Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 629 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
149 Id. at 2451 (O'Connor, I., concurring).
1
50 1d.
151 Id. at 2452.
[Tihe reasonable observer in the endorsement
inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and
context of the community and forum in which the
religious display appears. As I explained in
Allegheny, the 'history and ubiquity' of a practice
is relevant because it provides part of the context
in which a reasonable observer evaluates whether
a challenged governmental practice conveys a
message of endorsement of religion. Nor can the
knowledge attributed to the reasonable observer be
limited to the information gleaned simply from
viewing the challenged display. Id. at 2455.
According to Justice O'Connor:
a hypothetical observer should know the general
history of the place in which the cross is displayed.
Indeed, the fact that Capitol Square is a place, a
public park that has been used over time by private
speakers of various types is a range of private
speakers accompanied, if necessary, by an
appropriate disclaimer. Id. at 2456.
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accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community."'1
2
As in Rosenberger v. University of Virginia,'53 Justice O'Connor
signaled clearly that her Establishment Clause analysis would proceed
on a particularized, case by case basis.' In Pinette, the Court held that
it did not constitute an impermissible endorsement of religion under the
Establishment Clause to allow a private unattended cross in a public
forum.' Some of the factors important to Justice O'Connor in reaching
this result were: (1) "the religious expression was in a forum expressly
open to the public for speech under state law; (2) the state did not
sponsor the religious expression; (3) no special preference was given to
religious speech in terms of access to the forum..."; and (4) a sign was
present disclaiming government endorsement of the cross.'56
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment, and joined Justice
O'Connor in disagreeing with the plurality's statement that "erroneous
conclusion[s] of state endorsement . . . do not count" under the
152 Id. at 2456 (citations omitted).
' 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
'14 Pinete, 115 S. Ct. at 2454 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In the end, I would recognize that the
Establishment Clause inquiry cannot be distilled
into a fixed, per se rule. Thus, '[elvery
government practice must be judged in its unique
circumstances to determine whether it constitutes
an endorsement or disapproval of religion.' And
this question cannot be answered in the abstract,
but instead requires courts to examine the history
and administration of a particular practice to
determine whether it operates as such an
endorsement (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
'"Id. at 2450. "Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it
(1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly
announced and open to all on equal terms. Those conditionsare satisfied here, and therefore
the State may not bar respondents' cross from Capitol Square." Id.
116 d. at 2453.
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Establishment Clause.' Justice Souter explained that the plurality
departed significantly from the Court's precedents under the
Establishment Clause by seeking to replace the traditional endorsement
test with aperse rule that private religious speech in a public forum can
never violate the First Amendment.' In such cases as Lynch v.
Donnelly"' andAllegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,6 ° the Court has considered "whether the
challenged government practice has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing'
religion."'' This endorsementtest has involved analysis of the "unique
circumstancesand context of a particular challenged practice, ' as well
as questions about the effects of religious speech, including whether
observers perceive an endorsement.'63 Justice O'Connor's case-by-case
philosophy was embraced by "a majority of the Court" in Board of
Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, '64 where a fact-
specific approach was sensitive to "the circumstances of the specific
case."
, 165
Justice Souter also pointed out that the plurality's per se rule
opened a "serious loophole" in the Establishment Clause:
"governmental bodies and officials are left with generous scope to
I d. at 2448 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court that
an outsider, as opposed to a community member, could erroneously believe that the state
endorses religion when they witness religious ceremonies on school property and are not
aware of the school's availabilityto all types of groups. Id. at 2455. O'Connor believed that
the observer for the purposes of the Establishment Clause should be the reasonable
observer. Id.
' Id. at 2457.
"9 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
60 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
161 Id. at 592. See also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
162 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
163 Pinette. 115 S. Ct. at 2458-59 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that perception is
essential, and the way we assess perception is by asking whether the practice in question
creates the appearance of endorsement to the reasonable observer).
164 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
165 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2459 (Souter, J., concurring).
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encourage a multiplicity of religious speakers to erect displays in public
forums."' 66 This loophole exists because the plurality would only find
an Establishment Clause violation in a public forum in a limited number
of circumstances involving specific sorts of affirmative government
action. Theoretically, any other scenario would escape Establishment
Clause scrutiny under the plurality's test because the religious speech
would be private.'67
Like the concurringjustices, Justice Stevens in dissent believed
that it was important to ask if a "reasonable observer" would perceive
governmentendorsement of religion when the Klan cross is placed in the
Square.' 68 But Justice O'Connor's "reasonable observer" was too
idealized and exclusive for Justice Stevens.69 Where Justice O'Connor's
test did not specifically take into account non-believers, Justice Stevens
maintained that "[i]t is especially important to take account of the
perspective of a reasonable observer who may not share the particular
166 1d. at 2461.
67 Under Souter's reading of the plurality'srule, "[b]y allowing government to encourage
what it cannot do on its own, the proposed per se rule would tempt a public body to contract
out its establishment of religion, by encouraging the private enterprise of the religious to
exhibit what the government could not display itself." Id. at 2461. In fact, Justice Souter
suggested that "something of the sort... may have happened here." Id. When the District
Court ordered the Board to allow the Klan's display, "the Board granted 'blanket permission'
for 'all churches friendly to or affiliated with' the [local church council] to [display crosses,
apparently in an effort to blot out the Klan's cross] ... ." Id.
68 Id. at 2466 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620).
69 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2466 n.5:
[Justice O'Connor's] reasonable observer is a legal
fiction, 'a personification of a community ideal of
reasonablebehavior, determined by the [collective]
social judgment.' The ideal human Justice
O'Connor describes knows and understands much
more than meets the eye. Her 'reasonable person'
comes off as a well-schooled jurist, a being finer
than the tort-lawmodel. With respect, I think this
enhanced tort-law standard is singularly out of
place in the Establishment Clause context. Id.
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religious belief [at issue].' 17 Justice Stevens noted specifically that "[a]
paramount purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect [the non-
adherent] from being made to feel like an outsider in matters of faith,
and a stranger in the political community.'' 7.
Justice Stevens focused on the govemment's proprietary right to
exclude unwanted messages from its property and "to differentiate its
own message from those of public individuals."'17 2 For him, the Court's
public forum jurisprudence "do[es] not establish the right to implant a
physical structure (whether a campaign poster, a burning cross, or a
statue of Elvis Presley) on public property."'173
Based on these starting points, for Justice Stevens "the
endorsement inquiry under the Establishment Clause follows from the
State's power to exclude unattended private displays from public
property."' 74 "[When] the State allows [religious] displays in front of its
seat of government, viewers will reasonably assume that it approves of
them.",75
Justice Stevens explained that unattended displays near
government centers create a particular endorsement problem: "when a
statue or some other freestanding, silent, unattended, immoveable
structure regardless of its particular message appears on the lawn of the
Capitol building, the reasonable observer must identify the State as the
messenger, or at the very least, as one who has endorsed the message." '76
According to Justice Stevens, "the Establishment Clause generally
forbids the placement of a symbol of a religious character in, on, or
before a seat of government."177
170 Id. at 2466.
171 Id.
72 Id. at 2468.
173 Id.
'74 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2469.
175 id.
176 Id. at 2467.
177 Id. at 2469.
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Where the plurality seemed to emphasize that "Ohio ha[d] in the
past allowed three other private unattended displays" as evidence that an
observer would know that the State had not endorsed these displays and
did not endorse the Klan's cross, Justice Stevens found the other displays
to "[convey] the same message of approval and endorsement that [the
cross] does."'78  The Klan's cross is not made palatable under the
Establishment Clause because other religious symbols had been
displayed on the forum before, Justice Stevens maintained; all this tells
us is that "[t]he State of Ohio favors religion over irreligion."'79
In closing, Justice Stevens described the Court's decision as
unprecedented, stating "[i]t entangles two sovereigns [federal court and
state government] in the propagation of religion .. ."80 For Justice
Stevens, the facts of Pinette are a warning as to the conflicts that arise
when the separation of church and state breaks down. He noted that
"[t]he record indicates that the 'Grand Titan of the Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan for the Realm of Ohio' applied for a permit to place a cross
in front of the State Capitol because 'the Jews' were placing a 'symbol
for the Jewish belief in the Square."'' According to Justice Stevens:
"[t]hese facts illustrate the potential for insidious entanglement that
"' Id. at 2470.
"9 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2470. Justice Stevens would have distinguished the cases that
the plurality found controlling. Widmar and Lamb's Chapel involved access to government
facilities by identifiable private speakers, where Pinette involved an unattended display.
Id. In the former cases, "there was no danger of incorrect identification of the speakers and
no basis for inferring their messages had been endorsed by any public entity." Id. at 2471.
By contrast, in Pinette, "we are dealing with a visual display-a symbol readily associated
with a religion, in a venue readily associated with the State." Id. Justice Stevens contended
that another difference was that in Widmar and Lamb's Chapel "[t]he challenged
governmental action ha[d] a secular purpose, [and did] not have the principal or primary
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion ..... Id. "In contrast, the installation of the
religious symbols in [Pinette] quite obviously did 'have the principal or primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion."' Id.
180 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2473.
'8 Id. at 2465. A Menorah was placed in the Square. Id.
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flows from state-endorsed proselytizing."' "The cause of the conflict
is the State's apparent approval of a religious or anti-religious
message."'8 3 "Our Constitution wisely seeks to minimize such strife by
forbidding state-endorsed religious activity."84
In Pinette, five justices refused to join Justice Scalia and the
plurality in attempting to radically rewrite or eliminate the Court's
endorsement test under the Establishment Clause.8 5 Three justices
adhered to precedent in maintaining some form of an endorsement
test. ' 6 Although the margin was slim and the opposition not completely
united, in the end, conservative activists in the plurality may have won
the battle in Pinette, but at least temporarily lost an important part of the
I8 1d. at 2471.
'g Id. at 2472.
814 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2472. Justice Ginsburg's separate dissent noted there were no
"plainly visible" signs to make the public aware the cross was the Klan's and not endorsed
by Ohio's state govemmet. Id. at 2474. The lower court "did not mandate a disclaimer."
Id. And although the Klan attached a disclaimer to its cross, its disclaimer "was unsturdy[,]
it did not identify the Klan as sponsor; it failed to state unequivocally that Ohio did not
endorse the display's message; and it was not shown to be legible from a distance." Id.
Justice Ginsburg concluded that "whether a court order allowing display of a cross, but
demanding a sturdier disclaimer could withstand EstablishmentClause analysis is a question
more difficult than the'one this case poses." Id. at 2475.
85Justices Souter, O'Connor and Breyer stated, in reference to Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion, that "governmentpractices relating to speech on religious topics'must be subjected
to careful judicial scrutiny'.., and that the endorsementtest supplies an appropriate standard
for that inquiry." Id. at 2454. Meanwhile, Justice Ginsburg's dissent rested squarely on
the beliefthat no clear sign informed the public that Ohio's government did not endorse the
display's message. Id. at 2474. Justice Stevens dissented and stated that "neither precedent
nor respect for the values protected by the Establishment Clause justifies [the plurality's]
conclusion." Id. at 2465.
816 Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2454. The concurring Justices also looked at Allegheny, 492
U.S. 573, which provided precedent regarding the endorsement test and Establishment
Clause. Id. They noted the effect of enforcing the endorsement test under Allegheny was
significantto the EstablishmentClause, and a "principal way that we assess [the effects] is
by asking whether the practice in question creates the appearance of endorsement to the
reasonable observer." Id. at 2459. See also Establishment of Religion-Privately
Sponsored Religious Displays in Public Fora, 109 HARV. L. REv. 170, 171 (1995).
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war with respect to the meaning of the Establishment Clause.'87
IL Freedom of Speech
A. Cases Directly Concerning Restrictions on Free Expression
1. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union
In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,'.s the
Supreme Court held that an act which broadly prohibits federal
employees from accepting honoraria for making speeches or writing
articles is unconstitutional! 89 In 1989, the Quadrennial Commission on
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries had reported that "inflation
had decreased the salary levels for senior Government officials,
measured in constant dollars, by approximately 35 percent."'90 As a
result, the Commission concluded, many members of Congress and
other top government officials had supplemented their incomes by
accepting "'honoraria' for meeting with interest groups which desire to
influence their votes."' 9' Thus, the Commission recommended that
salaries for top officials be raised and a ban be imposed on the receipt of
honoraria by all federal employees.' 92 The President's Commission on
's' Scholars note that "[t]he jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause is currently in a
state of flux." See Establishment of Religion-Privately Sponsored Religions Displays in
Public Fora, supra note 186. The plurality and the concurrences in Pinette disagreed on
the meaning of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 176. The plurality stated that the
Establishment Clause is violated only where government actually favors or supports
religion, whereas the concurrenceargued that the Establishment Clause is violated when the
government'saction is perceived as an endorsementof religion. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2454.
181 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
189 Id.
'
90 Id. at 1009.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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Federal Ethics Law endorsed the Quadrennial Commission's report, and
Congress subsequently passed the Ethics Reform Act of 1989."91
"Section 703 of the Act provided a 25% pay increase to members of
Congress, federal judges, and Executive Branch [officials]."'94 Another
section of the Act amended Section 501(b) of the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978 to prohibit honoraria. 95 The Ethics Reform Act defined
honoraria as "compensation paid to a Government employee for an
appearance, speech or article,"' 96 and mandated that "[a]n individual
may not receive any honorarium while that individual is a Member,
officer or employee."'97
Two unions and numerous career civil servants brought suit to
challenge the constitutionality of the honoraria ban.'98 The action was
certified as a class action, with the class consisting "of all 'Executive
Branch employees' below grade GS-I 6 who-but for [the prohibition ]
would receive 'honoraria. '"'199
The District Court held the Act unconstitutional as applied to
Executive Branch employees, finding that the statute was both over-
inclusive, because it restricts too much speech, and under-inclusive,
because it prohibits honoraria for some forms of speech and not
others.2"' Further, the Court found section 501(b) severable20' because
193 Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989).







99Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1010. "In 1993, employees in the certified class earned
between $11,903 (GS- 1, Step i) and $86,589 (GS-1 5, Step 10) ." Id. "The mean grade was
a GS-9 which paid workers between $27,789 and $36,123." Id. at n.5.
'0' Nat'l Treasury Employees v. U.S., 788 F. Supp. 4, 11 (1992).
20 For example, a report issued after the Act was passed revealed Congress was most
concerned with "honoraria-relatedactivities" of its members, "indicating that the prohibition
on the receipt of honoraria by other members of the government workforce was not of
pivotal importance to passage of the Act." Id. at 12.
255
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the "prohibition on the receipt of honoraria by other members of the
government work-force was not of pivotal importance to passage of the
Act. 202
The Court of Appeals affirmed and noted that, even though
section 501(b) does not prohibit speech, the "denial of compensation"
for speech places a heavy burden on government employees. 203 The
Court held that the government's strong interest in preventing even the
appearance of impropriety did not justify a ban so broad that it did not
require "some sort of nexus between the employee's job and either the
subject matter of the expression or the character of the payor."2°4 The
Court of Appeals agreed that application of the Act to executive branch
employees was severable, noting that Congress had been primarily
concerned with its own members and that the ban had been adopted as
part of a package which included raises for Congress and other top-level
federal officials.0 5
In a split decision, the Supreme Court affirmed.20 6 Writing for
the majority, which included Justices Kennedy, Souter, Breyer and
Ginsburg, Justice Stevens applied the test the Court established in
Pickeringv. Board of Education of Township High School Distric 7 for
determining when restraints may be imposed on the speech of public
employees.0 8 Justice Stevens' majority opinion explained that the
Pickering test involves balancing the "interests of the [employee], as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest
202 Id.
203 Nat'l Treasury Employees v. U.S., 990 F.2d 1271, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
204 Id. at 1275.
205 Id. at 1278-79.
2
"
6Natl Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1019.
207 In Pickeringv. Board ofEd. ofTownship High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 571(1968),
the Court established the following test: "[s]pecifically the Government must show that the
interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and future employees in a
broad range of present and future expression are out-weighed by that expression's'necessary
impact on the actual operation' of the Government." Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1007.
208 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571; see also Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1007.
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of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees." 29 But the test applies, the
Court added, only to speech involving matters of public concern and not
private speech of "an employee upon matters only of personal
interest."2 10
The Court held that the respondents' expressive activity in this
case fell within the category covered by Pickering.21I The Court first
noted that most of the respondents in the present case sought
compensation for expressive activities which "ha[d] nothing to do with
their jobs and d[id] not even arguably have any adverse impact on the
efficiency of the offices in which they work. '212 In addition, the Court
stated that the broad sweep of section 501(b) makes the government's
burden heavy.3 Pickeringand most of its progeny, the Court explained,
"involve[d] a post hoc analysis of one employee's speech and its impact
on that employee's public responsibilities. 2 14  This case, however,
involved a "wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression by a
massive number of potential speakers. 21 5 Therefore, the Court held,
219 Natl Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1012.
210 Id. at 1013.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 1012. Some of the respondents included: "[a] mail handler employed by the
Postal Service ... who had given lectures on the Quaker religion for which he received
small payments.... An aerospace engineer employed at the Goddard Space Flight Center
... [who] lectured on black history for a fee of $100 per lecture [and a] microbiologist at
the Food and Drug Administration ... [who] earned $3,000 per year writing articles and
making television and radio appearances reviewing dance performances." Id. at 1010.
I3 d. at 1013.
214Nat7 Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1013.
25 Id. at 1013. In a partial concurrence, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's
distinction between ex post and ex ante prohibitions on speech and suggested that a "case-
by-case application"of Pickeringwas best. Id. at 1020. Nevertheless, she agreed with the
Court that the ban was unconstitutional as applied to the respondents for expressive
activities that bear no nexus to government employment. Id. at 1024. Justice O'Connor
dissented, however, from the part of the majority's opinion which barred application of the
ban to employees regardless of whether their speech bears a relationship to government
employment. Id. at 1023.
257
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even though a congressional judgment normally is accorded a stronger
presumption of validity than an individual executive's disciplinary
action, the widespread ban on honoraria "gives rise to far more serious
concerns than could any single supervisory decision," in that it "chills
potential speech before it happens."'21 6 Thus, the Court held that the
government must make a strong showing of justification." 7
The Court determined that, "[a]lthough section 501(b) neither
prohibits speech nor discriminates among speakers based on content..
its prohibition on compensation unquestionably imposes a significant
burden on expressive activity.'' 8 In addition, the Court noted that "the
ban impose[d] a far more significant burden on the respondents than on
the relatively small group of lawmakers whose past receipt of honoraria
prompted passage of the law." '219 The Court found that since the statute
allowed for the payment of travel expense reimbursement, the ban would
be unlikely to reduce the number of appearances by high-ranking
officials.22 However, the "denial of compensation for lower-paid,
nonpolicymaking employees will inevitably diminish their expressive
output," as well as burdening the "public's right to hear what the
employees would otherwise have [expressed]," and thus abridges speech
under the First Amendment.22
Because most of the expressive conduct at issue tends to occur
outside the workplace and does not involve the subject of government
employment, the majority noted, the government could attempt to justify
the ban only on the grounds of efficiency of the public service rather
236Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1014.
71d. "The Government must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a
vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of present and future
expression are outweighed by that expression's 'necessary impact on the actual operation'
of the Government." Id.
218 Id.
"' Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1014.
220 Id.
22 Id. at 1014-15.
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than the disruption of the workplace claim involved in Pickering.22 The
Court distinguished its holding in United Public Workers v. Mitchell,2
23
in which the Court upheld an Act prohibiting partisan political activity
by all classified federal employees. 24 The Court noted that where the
Act in Mitchell aimed to protect employees' rights by preventing them
from being induced to participate in order to advance in their
employment, honoraria "hardly appear to threaten employees' morale or
liberty.'125 The Court also concluded that the government had made no
showing as to ,how .the honoraria ban, at least with respect to those
employees below grade GS-16, serves the interests the government
asserted.226 If the underlying federal concern was to prevent federal
officials from misusing or appearing to misuse power by accepting
honoraria, the Court stated, the government must present evidence of the
harm resulting from the acceptance of honoraria by "an immense class
of workers with negligible power to confer favors on those who might
pay to hear them speak or to read their articles. 227
The Court also found that the text of the Act itself also
undermined the government's argument that the ban was a reasonable
response to the perceived threat honoraria posed to efficiency. 22' The
Act permits the acceptance of pay for a series of articles if there is no
nexus between the author's employment and either the subject matter of
the expression or the identity of the payor.229 The Court reasoned that
the government cannot argue that it would have difficulty enforcing the
statute if it had to include a nexus test generally?3 ° The Court noted that
222 Id. at 1015.
223 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
224 Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1016.
22 Id. at 10 15.,
226 Id. at 1016.
227 Id.
22 8 id.
229 Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1016.
230 Id. at 1017.
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the only argument put forth by the government concerning a general
nexus limitation was that "a wholesale prophylactic rule is easier to
enforce than one that requires individual nexus determinations. 23'
However, the Court held that a broad prophylactic rule could not justify
"[a] blanket burden on the speech of nearly 1.7 million federal
employees ... [based merely on] the government's dubious claim of
administrative convenience. 232
In addition, the Court held that the statute's definition of
honoraria further weakened the government's argument that the breadth
of section 501(b) was reasonably necessary to protect the efficiency of
the public service. 233 The Court noted that despite the fact that both
commissions that recommended the ban stressed the importance of
defining honoraria in a way that would close potential loopholes and
cover things such as consulting fees, travel and entertainment expenses,
and any other benefits that are the equivalent of honoraria, Congress
chose to restrict only expressive activities.234 The Court held that
expressive activity should, if anything, receive special protection and
that "[i]mposing a greater burden on speech than on other off-duty
activities assumed to pose the same threat to the efficiency of the federal
service is, at best, anomalous. 235
The Court also attached significance to the Office of
Government Ethics' regulations that limit the coverage of the statutory
terms "appearance, speech or article" to exclude a wide variety of
expressive activities that would normally have no nexus with an
employee's job, such as sermons, fictional writings, and athletic
competitions. 236 The Court held that these exclusions diminished the




234 Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1017.
235 ld.
236 1d. at 1018.
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employees for speech entirely unrelated to their work jeopardizes the
efficiency of the entire federal service."' Therefore, after noting the
anomalies in the statute and regulations, and the fact that the
policymakers'lossof honorariawas offset by a salary increase,the Court
concluded that "the speculative benefits the honoraria ban may provide
the Government are not sufficient to justify this crudely crafted burden
on respondents' freedom to engage in expressive activities." '238
With regard to remedy, the Court reversed the part of the Court
of Appeals' decision enjoining the enforcement of the honoraria ban as
applied to the entire executive branch of the government. 39 The Court
accepted the government's argument that the relief should be limited to
the parties before the Court, andthat senior executives should not be
covered, and thus limited relief to executive employees below grade GS-
16.240 Nevertheless, the majority specifically affirmed that part of the
Court of Appeals' decision which refused to remedy the First
Amendment problem by effectively adding a nexus requirement onto the
honoraria ban.24' The majority explained that attempting to do so would
constitute improper "judicial legislation," and ruled that the Court of
Appeals appropriately left it to Congress to redraft the statute.242
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
dissented on the grounds that the majority did not give sufficient weight
to the governmental justifications for the honoraria ban and overstated
the amount of speech that would actually be deterred. 243 Rehnquist
pointed out that the ban did not prohibit any speech, and asserted that the
fact that there was a financial disincentive to speech should only be
2 3 7 Id.
238 Id.
239 Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1018-19.
240 Id.
24j Id. at 1019.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 1024 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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relevant if the law is content or viewpoint based. 2" Rehnquist also
criticized the majority for not accepting :the right of Congress to
reasonably conclude that its interest in preventing impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety justified the ban and claimed that the Courts
cases involving political restrictions on partisan political activity
supported the principal of giving governmental interests great weight.
2 45
In addition, he complained that the Court's opinion
inappropriately focused "solely on the burdens of the statute as applied
to several carefully selected executive branch employees whose
situations present the application of the statute where the government's
interests are at their lowest ebb."246  The dissent also stated that the
Court's application of Pickering was not compelling, given that
Pickering, unlike the honoraria ban, involved a response to the content
of employee speech. 247 Furthermore, even if the honoraria ban was
unconstitutional,Rehnquist declared, the Court's remedy was too broad
and should have enjoined the ban only as applied to those under grade
GS- 16 who engaged in speech not related to their federal employment248
The Court's holding in National Treasury,249 affirms the principle
established in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State
Crime Victims Board,5° in which the Court appropriately recognized
that the government cannot do indirectly-through banning
244 Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1024-25. Rehnquist distinguished the Court's holding
from Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105 (1991) by noting that the financial disincentive to speech struck down in that case
involved a content-based law "which regulated an accused or convicted criminal's receipt
of income generated by works that described his crime." Id. at 1025.
241 Id. at 1027.
246 Id.
141ld. at 1029.
241 Id. at 103 1.
249 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
250 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (invalidating a New York statute which regulated payments
received by criminals for expressive conduct made about their crimes because the statute
was not narrow enough to further the state's objective of compensating victims from profits
received by the criminal).
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payment-what it cannot do directly-through censorship. Since the
government may not, under most circumstances, simply prohibit its
employees from speaking on matters of public concern, the Court held
in National Treasury, that the government may not try to achieve the
same result by preventing their employees from receiving payment for
that protected speech. 2
2. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commissions,253 the Supreme
Court considered whether an Ohio law that prohibited the distribution of
anonymous issue campaign literature violated the First Amendment.254
The Court held that Ohio could not constitutionallyprohibit anonymous
leafleting.2"
Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to people who attended
a public meeting at a middle school in Westerville, Ohio.2 56 The
meeting was called to discuss an upcoming referendum on a school tax
levy, and Mrs. McIntyre was distributing pamphlets in opposition to the
tax levy. 57 Some of the pamphlets had her name on them, but some of
them were labeled only with "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX
PAYERS." '258 A school official in favor of the levy warned Mrs.
McIntyre that distributing unsigned leaflets violated Ohio election
law 9.2 " After the levy ultimately passed several months later, the same
25 Id. at 115-19.
252 Natl Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1008.
253 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
2
1
4 Id. at 1514.
255 Id at 1524.
216Id. at 1514.
257 Id.
258 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
259 Id.
263
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school official filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commissions,
which found Mrs. McIntyre in violation of section 3599.09(A) of the
Ohio Code and fined her $100.26 ° The Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas reversed and held that the statute was unconstitutional?6I
The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the fine,262 and the
Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the decision.263
The United States Supreme Court held, by a 7-2 vote, that the
Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign
literature violated the First Amendment. 64 Justice Stevens wrote the
majority opinion which held that Ohio had not shown that the state's
"interest in preventingthe misuse of anonymous election-relted speech
justified a prohibition on all uses of that speech. ' 265 The Court noted
that although Mrs. McIntyre had passed away during the pendency of the
litigation, and the amount in controversy was only $100, it granted
certiorari because it considered the issue an important one.266
Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in which she
stressed the fact that a more limited identification requirement might be
permissible and that different circumstances could justify a disclosure
requirement of some kind.267 Justice Thomas, who concurred in the
260 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A)(Anderson 1988) which provides:
No person shall write, print, post, or distribute, or
cause to be written, printed, posted, or distributed,
a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement, sample
ballot, or any other form of general publication
which is designed to promote the nomination or
election or defeat of a candidate, or to promote the
adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the
voters in any election .... Id.
261 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1515.
262 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 598 N.E.2d 1170 (1993).
263 618 N.E.2d 152, 156 (1993).
264 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1524.
265 Id. at 1524.
266 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1516.
267 Id.
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judgment only, felt that the appropriate methodology was to "determine
whether the phrase 'freedom of speech, or of the press,' as originally
understood, protected anonymous political leafleting.""26 After going
through a long historical survey of anonymous leafleting, Justice
Thomas concluded that the Framers understood the First Amendment to
protect anonymous political leafleting?6 9 Justice Scalia, with whom the
Chief Justice Rehnquistjoined, dissented on the grounds that the statute
was a widely used and accepted practice and that the statute is an
effective and reasonable method of electoral regulation.270
The Court's majority opinion rejected Ohio's argument that the
regulation was a reasonable regulation of the electoral process.27" ' The
Court noted that anonymity is "not ordinarily a sufficient reason to
exclude ... [expressive conduct] from the protections of the First
Amendment." '272 The Court commented that anonymity is often
motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, concern about
social ostracism or merely a desire to protect as much of one's privacy
as possible."3 Speakers often opt for anonymity out of a belief that their
message will be more effective if the identity of the speaker is
unknown?74 This aspect of First Amendment protection is important in
both the literary realm and the area of political rhetoric.275 The Court
noted that its holding in Talley v. California276 "embraced a respected
2681 Id. at 1525.
269 1d. at 1530.
2 0 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1530-31. Justice Scalia also felt that the historical evidence
on the acceptability of the practice was inconclusive, and thus original intent could not be
the determinative factor. Id. at 1531-34.
271 Id. at 1516.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 1517.
271 See Talleyv. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960)(noting that "anonymous pamphlets,
leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of
mankind").
276 Id.
266 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XlII
tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes."
277
In Talley, the Court invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting all
anonymous leafleting?78 The Court rejected California's argument that
the law was aimed at preventing fraud, false advertisement and libel
because nothing in the text of the law limited its application to those
situations?79 Ohio offered the same defense as justification for its law.280
The Court held in McIntyre that since the text of the Ohio law, like that
of the statute in Talley, "lacked language 'limiting its application to
fraudulent, false or libelous statements"' the state's defense must fail.'
The fact that the California statute could be applied to cases where there
was no hint of falsity or libel was well-illustrated by the facts of
McIntyre.282 However, the Ohio law is distinguishable from the law in
Talley in that the Ohio law prohibited only anonymous leafleting
designed to influence voters283 while Talley prohibited all anonymous
leafleting! 4 Thus, the United States Supreme Court agreed that Talley
might not be controlling.285
Ohio argued that their election law was merely a regulation of
the electoral process, and relied on Supreme Court cases involving
regulation of the voting process, such as Anderson v. Celebrezze286 and
Storer v. Brown, 287 in which the Court applied a balancing test
277 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1517.
278 Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
279 Id. at 66 (Harlan, J., concurring).




284 Talley, 362 U.S. at 60-61. The Los Angeles ordinance challenged here prohibited all
anonymous handbilling in any place underany circumstances. Id. See Mclntyre, 115 S. Ct.
at 1517.
28 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1517.
286 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (striking down Ohio's early filing deadline requirement of its
election laws as unconstitutional after balancing the state's interests and individual's
constitutional rights).
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comparable to that used in "ordinary litigation" to determine if the state's
interest justified the regulation. 288 The Court held, however, that the
"ordinary litigation" test did not apply, because the Ohio regulation,
unlike the ones in Storer and Celebrezze, was a direct regulation of the
content of speech and not a control on the mechanics of the electoral
process. 289  The Ohio law covered the type of political speech that
"occupies the core of the protection afforded by the First
Amendment. ' 29  Thus, the Court held that the restriction must be
subjected to "exacting scrutiny" and would only be upheld if it were
"narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest. ' 291
The State argued that even if strict scrutiny were to be applied
to the ordinance, the ordinance was justified by the State's important and
legitimate interests-in preventing fraudulent and libelous statements, and
providing the electorate with relevant information.292 The Court held
that Ohio's informational interest was clearly insufficient to support the
constitutionalityof the law, because in the case of a handbill written by
a private citizen, the name and address of the author add "little, if
anything, to the reader's ability to evaluate the document's message.'293
With respect to the prevention of fraud and libel, the Court agreed with
Ohio's claim that those were compelling government interests, and that
287 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (holding that California's statute requiring party disaffiliation for
at least one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election for people seeking
ballot positions as independentcandidates for Congress, the presidency, or vice presidency,
was not unconstitutional).
288 See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 (stating that a court must resolve constitutional
challenges to a state's election laws by an "analytical process that parallels its work in
ordinary litigation"); Storer, 415 U.S. at 730 ("[T]he rule fashioned by the Court to pass
on constitutionalchallengesto specific provisions of election laws provides no litmus-paper
that for separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious under the
Equal Protection Clause.").
289 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1598.
290 Id.




293 Id. at 1520.
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those interests were particularly important during election campaigns.294
However, Ohio's election code already contained a provision that
specifically prohibited making or disseminating false statements during
political campaigns.295 Thus, the ban on anonymous leafleting was not
Ohio's primary method to fight fraud. 296  The Court held that the
ancillary benefits of the statute did notjustify section 3599.09(A)'sbroad
prohibition.297
Lastly, the State argued that the Court's holdings in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti29 and Buckley v. Valeo299 regarding
campaign expenditures applied to the present case. Specifically, Ohio
claimed that the Court's rulings supported the constitutionality of the
Ohio statute.300 Although the Court commented in dicta in Bellotti that
requiring identification of corporate advertisers might be permissible,3 °0
the Court held in McIntyre that Bellotti does not apply to the kind of
independent activity pursued by Mrs. McIntyre. °2 Similarly, the Court
held that the disclosure of campaign expenditures which it upheld in
Buckley did not save Ohio's law, although Buckley might justify a more
294 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1520.
295 Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3599.09. 1(B)-.2(B) (Anderson 1988) (prohibiting
the making and dissemination of false statements knowingly and with intent to affect the
outcome of an election campaign).
296 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1531.
297 id.
298 435 U.S..765 (1978).
299424 U.S. I (1976).
30 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522.
30 1 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792 n.32 ("[Clorporate advertising, unlike some methods of
participation in political campaigns, is likely to be highly visible. Identification of the
source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be
able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.").
3'0 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522 (holding that Bellotti concerned the scope of First
Amendment protection afforded to corporations and therefore does not apply in this case).
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narrowly drawn statute." 3 The holdings of these two cases were not
dispositive of the case at issue.30 4 "Required disclosures about the level
of financial support a candidate has received from various sources are
supported by an interest in avoiding the appearance of corruption that
has no application to this case."3 5
The Court explained that although anonymity may sometimes
serve as a shield for fraudulent conduct, the importance of free political
speech generally outweighs state interests in statutes of this sort which
involve broad prohibitions.3 6 Furthermore, "[u]nder our Constitution,
anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but
an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent."30 7 Thus, states may
not "indiscriminately[outlaw] a category of speech, based on its content,
with no necessary relationship to the danger sought to be prevented."30
The Court upheld the notion that when private individuals engage in
traditional forms of speech, the states must offer a strong justification for
restricting them, especially in the area of political speech.30 9 Although
the Court has allowed restrictions and disclosure requirements with
regard to campaign expenditures, and the Court has allowed various
other restrictions with regard to regulation of the electoral process, the
Court has drawn a line at legislation which is broad enough to allow the
prosecution of someone who engages in an act like Mrs. Mclntyre's.3"0
The Court emphasized the fact that the petitioner in this case
was a private individual who was acting independently?" It explicitly
303 Id. at 1524. The Court reasoned that the Ohio statute's infringement on speech is
more intrusive than the financial expenditure disclosure requirement in Buckley and it rests
on less and different state interests. Id. at 1523.
304 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1522.
305 Id. at 1523.
306 Id. at 1524.
307 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1524.
308 Id.
3
-9Id. at 1513, 1519, 1524.
310 Id. at 1518, 1519, 1523.
31 McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1514.
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stated that a different standard might apply in other situations. 1 2
Therefore, the case offers little guidance as to how the Court would rule
in a case involving, for example, restrictions on anonymous
pamphleteeringby private organizationsor corporations. Thus, although
the case is a strong statement in favor of the political free speech rights
of the individual, its influence may not extend far beyond that context?, 3
3. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston,314 the Supreme Court was called on to determine whether
Massachusetts may, under a state law prohibiting discrimination in
public accommodations, require private citizens, who organize a
traditionally open parade, to include a group imparting a message that
the organizers do not wish to convey.3"5 The Court unanimously held
that such an application of the law violated the parade organizers' First
Amendment rights.316
The City of Boston has traditionally had a St. Patrick's
Day/Evacuation Day Parade.317 Although the City had previously
sponsored the parade, the South Boston Allied War Veterans' Council
took over the parade in 1947.3"8 Every year since, the Council, an
unincorporated association of individuals elected from various veterans
312Id. at 1524 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that "[i]n for a calf is not always in for
a cow.... We do not thereby hold that the State may not in other, larger circumstances,
require the speaker to disclose its interests by disclosing its identity.").
313See, e.g., id. at 1523-24.
314 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
"' Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2340-41.
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groups, has applied for and received a permit for the parade?19 In 1992,
the respondents, the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston ("GLIB"), sought to march in the parade?" After the Council
denied GLIB's application, the organization obtained a state-court order
to permit it to march in the parade.32' GLIB's participation in the 1992
parade proved "uneventful.
322
In 1993, after the Council again refused GLIB's application to
participate, the organization filed suit against the Council for violation
of the state and federal constitutions.3 23 GLIB also claimed that the
Council violated the state public accommodations law, which prohibits
"any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of... sexual
orientation ... relative to the admission of any person to, or treatment
in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement. 324
The trial court found that because the Council had no written
criteria and employed no particular procedures for admission to the
parade, and did not inquire into the specific views of the applicants, the
parade did not constitute expressive activity? 25 The Court also ruled that
the parade fell within the statutory definition of a public
accommodation.326  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
affirmed the trial court's holdings. 3 27  The Supreme Court, in a
unanimous decision delivered by Justice Souter, reversed and held that
319 Id.




324 Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 272, § 98 (1995)).
323 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2341-42.
326 Id. at 2341.
327 Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. Boston, 636 N.E.2d
1293, 1300-01 (1994). Although GLIB had originally claimed that the denial of access
violated the state and federal constitutions because the parade should be considered to be
state action, the trial court ruled against GLIB on that ground and GLIB did not pursue the
claim in the Supreme Court. Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2342-44.
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requiring the Council to admit GLIB violated the Council's First
Amendment rights.328
The Court first addressed the lower courts' finding that the
parade lacked an expressive element for First Amendment purposes. 29
The Court stated that on that issue, the Court was under a "constitutional
duty to conduct an independent examination of the record as a whole,
without deference to the trial court. 330
The Court then determined that inherent in the definition of
"parade" is the idea that the marchers are "making some sort of
collective point, not just to each other but to bystanders along the
way.. 33 Thus, Justice Souter noted, parades are a form of expressive
activity, as illustrated by the Court's holdings in cases involving protest
marches.33 2  "[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a
condition of constitutional protection. '3 3 Nor is it required that the
speaker generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the
communication.334 Therefore, the Court held that the Council's action
of having a parade qualified as expressive activity, and GLIB's
participation "as a unit in the parade was equally expressive,', 311 given
that GLIB was formed for the explicit purpose of marching in the parade
as a means of celebrating its members identities as openly gay, lesbian,
32 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2340-41.
329 Id. at 2344.
330 Id. at 2344. Although deference to the trial court's findings of fact is generally
required, the facts and the conclusion of law as to the federal right are so intertwined in First
Amendment cases that the Court is obliged to make a fresh examination of the facts. Id.
131 Id. at 2345.
332 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2345; see, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969)
(involving a protest march to express dissatisfaction with the city government); Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (involving a march protesting racially
discriminating practices).
331 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2345 (citing Spencer v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411(1974)).
134 Id. at 2345. Constitutional protection is available for a speaker who reproduces the
speech of another, because the speaker's work need not be original. Id.
335 Id.
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and bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants.336
The Court found that although the Massachusetts public
accommodations law was "well within the State's usual power," '337 and
"[did] not, on its face, target speech or discriminate on the basis of its
content, '3 8 the law had been applied in a peculiar way.339 Because the
petitioners "disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as such," and no
individual member of GLIB has been prohibited from participating in
the parade as a member of any approved group, "the disagreement goes
to the admission of GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its own
banner."4° Given the expressive character of the parade and the GLIB
marching unit, the state court's decision effectively declared the
sponsors' speech to be a public accommodation.341 Thus the sponsors'
speech violated the First Amendment rule that "a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message." '342
One important principle of free speech is that a speaker may
choose not only what to say, but also "what not to say," Justice Souter
explained 43 This applies in regard to statements of fact that the speaker
would rather avoid.344 Clearly, the Council chose to "exclude a message
it did not like from the communication it chose to make," the Court
336 Id.
337 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2346. The siates maintain the power to establish provisions in
order to ensure the protection of those groups who suffer from discrimination. Id.
331 Id. at 2347.
"' "[E]nforcement [of the law did] not address any dispute about the participation of
openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals in various units admitted to the parade." Id.
340 Id.
341 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2347.
342 id.
343 As precedent, Justice Souter cites Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986). Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2347.
344 Mclntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1516. The State cannot compel a speaker to express statements
of fact, "expressions of value, opinion[s], or endorsement[s]" the speaker does not agree
with. Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2347.
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stated, that choice was entitled to constitutional protection.345
The Court also explained and distinguished its holding in Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,346 where the Court addressed the
subject of compelled access for expressive purposes.34 The Court
explained that in reviewing regulations "requiring cable operators to set
aside channels for designated broadcast signals, [it had] applied only
intermediate scrutiny. '  A cable company serves as a mere conduit,
and there is little risk that viewers will think the stations carried on the
system convey messages endorsed by the operator.349 However, a
parade, similar to a newspaper, is "more than a passive receptacle or
conduit for news, comment, and advertising.""35 A parade does not
consist of "individual, unrelated segments that happen to be transmitted
together for individual selection by members of the audience."35' Since
the parade's overall message is distilled and perceived by spectators
from viewing the individual units in the parade as a whole, a parade does
not readily perm it the sponsor to disavow identity of viewpoint between
it and the participants.352
In addition, the Court found that there was no concern here, as
there is with a cable company, of limiting monopolistic autonomy to
allow the survival of various speakers.353 In contrast, the Turner Court
... The Court stated that whateverthe Council's reasons for prohibiting GLIB's message
in the parade, the Council's choice to prescribe the content of their message is "presumed
to lie beyond the government's power to control." Id at 2348.
346 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
341 In Turner Broadcasting, the Court faced the issue of whether the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, requiring cable television stations to
broadcast local television, violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and
freedom of the press. ld. at 2451.
341 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2348 (citing Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 662).
349 Id. at 2348-49 (citing Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 655).
350 Id. at 2348 (citations omitted).
351 Id. at 2349.
352 Id.
13 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2349.
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stated that the government was attempting to secure the survival of
broadcasters who "might otherwise be silenced and consequently
destroyed." '354 The Court did not view the case at hand as being about
the survival of gay speakers, but rather as an attempt to alter the
Council's speech regarding gays.3" Although the Court acknowledged
that "the size and success of petitioners' parade makes it an enviable
vehicle for the dissemination of GLIB's views," '356 GLIB had not
indicated that it would notbe able to have a parade of its own, or that the
petitioners "enjoy the capacity to 'silence the voice of competing
speakers,' as cable operators do with respect to program providers who
wish to reach subscribers. 357 The Court concluded that when the
accommodations law "[was] applied to limit expressive activity, as in
this case, its apparent object [was] simply to require speakers to modify
the content of their expression.""3 8 "But in the absence of some further
legitimate end, this object [was] merely to allow exactly what the
general rule of speaker's autonomy forbids." '359
In upholding First Amendment principles in Hurley, Justice
Souter's opinion also managed to avoid several potential conflicts with
respect to other individual liberties concerns. In several lower court
cases, explicit conflicts have arisen between the First Amendment and
civil rights statutes. For example, the Supreme Court-over the dissent
of Justice Thomas-recently denied certiorari in an Alaska case in
which a landlord unsuccessfully claimed that requiring compliance
under a state law against discrimination based on marital status would
354 Id. (citing Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 656).
355 See Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2350. The purpose of the anti-discrimination statute, on its
face, is to ensure that gays and lesbians will not be denied public accommodations on
account of their sexual orientation. Id. However, as applied, the statute's effect is to
prescribe the contents of the Council's expression. Id.
356 Id. at 2349.
I' d. (quoting Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 656).
151 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2350.
359 Id.
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force a violation of the landlord's right to free exercise of religion.3 60 A
similar conflict could have arisen in Hurley, but by focusing on the
threshold issue of whether the parade was an expressive activity, the
Court avoided such a potentially difficult issue as whether the public
accommodations law provided the basis for a compelling state interest
justifying infringement of First Amendment rights."' Such a question
may well be faced on remand in future cases.362
In addition, in ruling that the parade was private expression
entitled to autonomy for whatever reason its sponsors chose, the Court
avoided substantive discussion of efforts such as those in Massachusetts
360 Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 291 (Alaska 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994) (Moore, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the Hobson's Choice
individuals face when compliance with a law violates personal exercise of a fundamental
right). Based upon his Christian Religious beliefs, a landlord. refused to rent to unmarried
co-habitatingcouples. Id. The Alaska Court held enforcementof fair housing laws did not
violate landlord's right to free exercise of religion. Id. While religious belief and faith
receive absolute First Amendment protection, conduct dictated by religious belief is limited
by neutral and generally applicable state laws. Id.
36 See generally Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2350. Since the Court stated that the State lacked
a "further, legitimateend" in applying the anti-discrimination law to practice organizers of
a parade, had the State provided a compellinggovernment interest, the Court may have been
compelled to address the issue of balancing the parade council's First Amendment rights
with the State's legitimate purpose. Id.
362 The Court has often addressed the issue of weighing fundamental rights against
legitimate government anti-discriminationinterests. See Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S.
574 (1983) (holding school's religious practice of racial discrimination was outweighed by
the State's interest in prohibiting racial discrimination in education); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding the State of Minnesota had a compelling
interest in prohibiting discrimination against women and therefore could constitutionally
require the Jaycees, a civic organization, to admit women members, despite existing
members right to freedom of association and freedom of speech); Board of Directors of
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (holding the State of California
could require Rotary clubs to admit women because, despite slight infringemmt on existing
members rights to expressive association, the State had a compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination against women).
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to prevent discrimination based on sexual orientation. 63 By suggesting
that GLIB's participationas a unit in the parade was expressive in nature,
the opinion may well aid First Amendment claims of gays and lesbians
on issues such as gays in the military, although any such effect is
indirect at best.3 64 Future cases, such as the case accepted for certiorari
in 1995-96 concerning Colorado's state constitutional referendum
against anti-bias laws protecting gays and lesbians, will clearly reveal
more about the Court's views on this subject.365
363 See generally JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE EVOLvING CONSTITUTION: How THE
SUPREME COURT HAS RULED ON ISSUES FROM ABORTION TO ZONING I (Random House
1992). "Constitutional law has not yet fully ratified the reality of a sexually permissive
American, and it will not likely do so in the near future." Id. at 245. However, "states
remain free, within some limits, to define the boundaries of sexual behavior. Since 1961,
half the states have repealed their anti-sodomy laws, and it is clear that if they choose, the
states may extend specific protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual
preference or orientation." Id. at 490.
364 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of gays and lesbians in the
military; however, due to a disparity among the lower courts regarding the constitutionality
of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy it is possible the Supreme Court will address this issue.
Alan N. Yount, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: The Same Old Policy in a New Uniform? 12 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 215,237-38 (1995). Should the Court find homosexuality
an "immutable characteristic" based on evidence of a biological cause, the Court would
apply strict scrutiny review to the military's policy; "this could tip the balance in favor of
greater protection for homosexual service members." Id. Due to the emotional aspect of
this issue, "there is wide 'disagreement as to what the Court's ultimate decision [will] be"
should they grant certiorari. Spiro P. Fotopoulus, The Beginning of the End for the
Military's TraditionalPolicy on Homosexuals: Steffan v. Aspen, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
611, 641 (1994). Determining whether homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class
will be an important, potentially determinativeissue for Supreme Court review. Id. at 642.
But see Arthur A. Murphy, ET AL., Gays in the Military: What About Morality, Ethics,
Character, and Honor?, 99. DICK. L. REv. 3 31, 355 (1995). It is "highly improbable" that
the Supreme Court will ever hold that homosexuals are a suspect or semi-suspect class,
therefore "the military's institutional morality could have a central role in justifying
substantial constraints on the service of homosexuals." Id.
365 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (holding that Amendment 2 to the Colorado
State Constitution, which precluded all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level
of state or local government designed to protect the status of persons based on their
"homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, or relationships," violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
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4. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.
In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,366 a unanimous Court held that
section 5(e)2 of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act
unconstitutionally restricted speech by prohibiting the displaying of
alcohol content on beer labels367 The Court applied the Central Hudson
Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission36 test to analyze
the federal government's regulation of commercial speech, rejecting the
government'sposition that a more deferential standard should be applied
to government restrictions on speech promoting socially harmful
activities.369 The Court concluded that while the government's interest
in preventing "strength wars" based on alcohol content was a substantial
interest, the restriction on speech did not directly advance that interest
in the context of other regulation and the restriction was not sufficiently
tailored to its goal.37
The controversy developed out of Coors' application to the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to develop labels and
advertisingthat disclosed the alcohol content of Coors beer.37' When the
Bureau rejected the application, citing the Act's prohibition of alcohol
content appearing on beer labels or in advertising, Coors filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado, arguing that the
prohibitory provisions of the Act were unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.372 After initial skirmishes in the District Court and the
366 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
361 Id. at 1594 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion in
which he criticized the Central Hudson test applied by the Court as creating an artificial
distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech, Id. Justice Stevens
maintained that only commercial speech that misleads consumers can properly be restricted.
Id.
36' 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
369 Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1589-90 n.2.
"0 1d. at 1594.
311 Id. at 1588.
372 Id.
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Court of Appeals on the appropriate legal standard,373 the District Court
upheld the prohibition as to advertising but struck down the prohibition
as to labeling.374 The federal government appealed the District Court's
ruling as to labeling,375 but Coors did not appeal the ruling as to
advertising? 6 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court,377 and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Tenth Circuit's
holding that the labeling ban violates the First Amendment because it
fails to advance a government interest in a direct and material way.37
The Court noted that both parties agreed that the information on
beer labels constitutes commercial speech. 79 The ban on labeling was
analyzed under Central Hudson, which applies to commercial speech
that is lawful activity and is not misleading." In order for a regulation
of commercial speech to pass First Amendment muster under Central
Hudson, a court must find that (1) there is a substantial governmental
interest at stake; (2) the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted; and (3) the regulation is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve the governmental interest.3"'
373 Id.





379 Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1589.
380 Id.
s Id. (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566). The Central Hudson test reads
in full:
For commercial speech to come within [First
Amendment review], it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest. Id.
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It was undisputed that Coors wished to disclose non-misleading
factual information about alcohol content on its beer labels.3"2 Analysis
by the Supreme Court thus began with the interest asserted by the
government.383
The Court rejected the government's asserted. interest in
facilitating state efforts to regulate alcohol under the Twenty-first
Amendment?84 It agreed that the government had asserted a substantial
interest by arguing that strength wars between beer manufacturers
competing on the basis of alcohol content threatened public health and
safety.385 However, the government failed the remaining parts of the
Central Hudson test. The Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that the
restriction on labeling failed to advance .the interest in suppressing
strength wars sufficiently to justify the ban.386
The remaining factors of the Central Hudson test, the Court
explained, boiled down to a consideration of the 'fit' between the
legislature'sends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.3 .8 The
382 Id. at 1590. "Both the lower courts and the parties agree that respondent seeks
to disclose only truthful, verifiable, and non-misleading factual information about alcohol
content on its beer labels." Id.
383 Id.
384 Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1591. "The Government attempts to bolster its position by
arguing that the labeling ban not only curbs strength wars, but also 'facilitates' state efforts
to regulate alcohol under the Twenty-first Amendment." Id. "We conclude that the
Government's interest in preservingstate authority is not sufficiently substantial to meet the
requirements of Central Hudson." Id.
385 Id. at 1591. "So too the Governmenthere has a significant interest in protecting
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens by preventing brewers from competing on the





The remaining Central Hudson factors require that
a valid restriction on commercial speech directly
advance the governmental interest and be no more
extensivethan necessary to serve that interest. We
have said that '[t]he last two steps of the Central
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Court explained that this part of the test placed a burden on the
government to "[show] that the challenged regulation advances the
Government's interest in a 'direct and material way.""'38 The Court added
that "mere speculation and conjecture" about harm is not enough.38 9 In
order to meet its burden, the government "must demonstrate that the
harms it recites are real and that [the government's] restriction will in
fact alleviate [the harms] to a material degree." '39 If the government met
this burden, the Court indicated, it still would have to show that its
regulation of speech was sufficiently tailored to the goal of preventing
strength wars.39 '
The Court found that the government failed to meet its burden
because of the overall irrationality of the government's regulatory
scheme.392  The government's asserted interest in preventing
"competitive pressures to market beer on the basis of alcohol content"
was undermined by other provisions of the Act that allowed or even
required wine and spirits manufacturers to disclose alcohol content on
labels and permitted brewers to signal high alcohol content through use
of the term "malt liquor. ' 393
Hudson analysis basically involve a consideration
of the 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends.
Id. (citing Posadas Rico Ass'n v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986)).
38 Id. at 1592. "In Edenfiela we decided that the Government carries the burden
of showing that the challenged regulation advances the Government's interest'in a direct and
material way."' Id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
3" Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1592.
390 Id. (quoting Edenfeld, 507 U.S. at 771).
'9' Id. at 1591.
391 Id. at 1592. "The failure to prohibit the disclosure of alcohol content in
advertising, which would seem to constitute a more influential weapon in any strength war
than labels, makes no rational sense if the government's true aim is to suppress strength
wars." Id.
... Id. "Other provisions of the FAAAand its regulations similarly undermine
section 205(e)(2)'s effort to prevent strength wars. While section 205 (e)(2) bans the
disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels, itallows the exact opposite in the case of wines
and spirits." Id. "Further, the Government permits brewers to signal high alcohol content
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The Court concluded that "[tihere is little chance that [section]
205(e)(2) [of the Act] can directly and materially advance its aim [of
combatting strength wars], while other provisions of the same Act
directly undermine and counteract its effects.' 94 The lower court "found
that the government failed to present any credible evidence showing that
the disclosure of alcohol content would promote strength wars."
Additionally, "[t]he Government did not offer any convincing evidence
that the labeling ban has inhibited strength wars.395 "Even if the
government had met its burden of showing that the ban on labeling
alcohol content advanced the interest in preventing strength wars in a
direct and material way, the Court found that "the Government's
regulation of speech [wa]s not sufficiently tailored to its goal." '396 There
were several other options that the government could have chosen to
achieve its goal that would have been less restrictive of speech, "such as
directly limiting the alcohol content of beers, prohibiting marketing
efforts emphasizing high alcohol strength... or limiting the labeling ban
only to malt liquors, which is the segment of the market that allegedly
is threatened with a strength war." '397 Overall, the decision in Rubin
provides another example of the Court's increasingly vigorous First
Amendment protection for most forms of commercial speech.
5. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.
In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,398 the Supreme Court upheld,
in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice O'Connor, a rule of the Florida Bar
through the use of the term 'malt liquor."' Id.
1
9 4 Id. at 1593.
391 Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1593.
396 Id. "Even if section 205 (e)(2) did meet the Edenfield standard, it would still
not survive First Amendment scrutiny because the Government's regulation of speech is not
sufficiently tailored to its goal." Id.
397 Id
398 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
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prohibiting personal injury lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail
solicitations to victims and their relatives for thirty days following an
accident or disaster.399
After the Florida Bar completed a two year study of the effects
of lawyer advertising on public opinion, it recommended to the Florida
Supreme Court amendments to the existing state rules on advertising.4 °0
In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court adopted Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) and Rule
4-7.8(a), which together prohibit a lawyer from either sending a direct-
mail solicitation to any person within thirty days after an accident has
occurred, or from accepting referral from a referral service which
engages in this practice 4°0 1 "In March 1992, G. Stewart McHenry, owner
of Went For It, Inc., a lawyer referral service, filed an action for
declaratory and injunctive relief," claiming that the rules violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.0 2 The District
Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff,40 3 and the Court of
Appeals affirmed.40 4 The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the
Florida rule.40 5
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion explained that the Court's
holding in Bates v. State Bar ofArizona °6 and subsequent cases clearly
399 Id.
400Id. at 2374. "In 1989, the Florida Bar completed a 2-year study of the effects
of lawyers advertising on public opinion. After conducting hearings, commissioning
surveys, and reviewing extensive public commentary, the Bar determined that several
changes to its advertising rules were in order." Id.
401 Id.
402 Id.
403 808 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (rejecting Magistrate Judge's report and
recommendations).
" Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 1994).
401 115 S. Ct. at 2371. "We believe that the Florida Bar's 30-day restriction on
targeted direct-mail solicitation of accident victims and their relatives withstands scrutiny
under the three-part Central Hudson test that we may have devised for this context." Id. at
2381.
406 433 U.S. 350, 366, 388 (1977) (holding that commercial speech, which serves
individual and societal interests, is entitled to some First Amendment protection).
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established the principle that "lawyer advertising is commercial speech
and, as such, is accorded a measure of First Amendment protection." 407
However, the Court emphasized that commercial speech is accorded a
more limited measure of protection and that restrictions on such speech
receive an intermediate level of scrutiny under the "framework set forth
in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.. v. Public Service
Commission. "48 The Court re-stated the three-pronged test of Central
Hudson for determining how "government may regulate commercial
speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading: First the
government must assert a substantial government interest; second, the
government must demonstrate that the regulation directly and materially
advances that interest; and third, the regulation must be narrowly
drawn."409
The Florida Bar asserted that it had a substantial interest not only
in protecting the privacy interest of personal injury victims against
unsolicited contact by lawyers, but also in maintaining the reputation of
the legal profession by preventing this type of contact, which the State
argued was regarded as "deplorable" by the general public4 " The Court
noted that "[s]tates have a compelling interest in the practice of
professions within their boundaries . . . and [that] the protection of
potential clients' privacy is a substantial state interest.'"" Therefore, the
Court held that the State had met the first prong of the Central Hudson
test.
412
Under the second prong of Central Hudson, the state must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that the state's
restriction will in fact alleviate the harms to a material degree.4 3 The
407 Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2375.
4. Id. at 2375-76 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557).
409 Id. at 2376.
4 10 1d.
411 Id.
411 Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376.
411 Id at 2377.
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majority noted that the Florida Bar had "submitted a 106-page summary
of its two-year study on lawyer advertising and solicitation," which
contained both "statistical and anecdotal" evidence about public views
on direct mail advertising.' The report indicated that Floridians have
negative feelings about attorneys who use direct mail advertising, and
that a large portion of the public viewed contacting victims of accidents
as an invasion of privacy."' 5 Based on such evidence, the majority ruled
that the second prong of Central Hudson was satisfied, and that the
direct-mail solicitation ban at issue "target[ed] a. concrete,
nonspeculative harm." '4 16
The Court also distinguishedits holding in Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Assn.,' 7 on which the Court of Appeals had relied in determining
that the direct-mail ban was unconstitutional and that the invasion of
privacy resulting from direct-mail was insubstantial.4"8 The Court
explained that the direct-mail ban overturned in Shapero was not
justified by the State as a measure to prevent invasions of privacy, but
rather "the state in that case was focused exclusively on the special
dangers of overreaching [involved] in targeted solicitations." '419 In
addition, the majority stated that the fact that the direct-mail ban in
Shapero was a "broad ban on all direct-mail solicitations, whatever the
time frame and whoever the recipient... and that the state produced no
evidence attempting to demonstrate any actual harm," distinguished it
further from Florida Bar.42° The Court ruled that "an untargeted letter
mailed to society at large is different in kind -from a targeted
.solicitation," and does not invade the privacy of the bereaved or damage
414 Id.
415 "Fifty-four percent of the general population surveyed said that contacting
persons concerning accidents or similar events is a violation of privacy." Id.
416 Id. at 2378.
417 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
4' Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2378.
419 Id.
410 ld. at 2378.
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the reputation of the profession in the same way as targeted mail of the
kind barred by the Florida rule.42'
The Court also distinguished its holding in Bolger: v. Youngs
Drug Product Corp.,422 in which the Court "rejected the federal
government's attempt to ban "offensive" and "intrusive" direct-mail
advertising for contraceptives.. 3 The Court explained that although the
offended recipient of the contraceptive advertisement may avert
substantial injury by merely throwing the material away, the harm at
issue in this case is not as easy to avoid.4 24 "The harm that the state is
concerned with is not the citizens offense in the abstract," Justice
O'Connor suggested, "but instead with the demonstrable detrimental
effects that such offense has on the profession it regulates.' 25 Since part
of the harm is the very receipt of the direct-mail ."within days of the
accident," the majority further stated, "[t]hrowing the letter away
after[wards ] ... does little to [alleviate the harm]."4 26 Therefore, the
Court held that the state had shown substantial harm; and thus, had met
the requirements of the second prong of the Central Hudson test.427
The Court began its analysis of the application of the third prong
of the Central Hudson test, which concerns the fit between the state's
interests and the means chosen, by noting that the test does not require
that the least restrictive means be chosen.4 28 What is required is that the
fit be reasonable and that the "means be narrowly tailored to achieve the
desired objective. '" 429 The majority rejected the claim that the ban was
over-inclusive in that it banned solicitation to all citizens regardless of
421 Id. at 2379.
422 463 U.S. 60 (1983).




427 Id. at 2378.
428 Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380.
429 Id.
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the level of their injuries or grief.43 The Court reasoned that "drawing
difficult lines on the basis that some injuries are severe and some
situations appropriate (and others, presumably, inappropriate) for grief'
would be problematic, and that the Florida Bar's rule was reasonably
well-tailored to its stated objective.43'
The majority also rejected the claim that the rule would prevent
citizens from learning about their legal options at a time when it may be
crucial to their case, and when other, such as opposing counsel and
insurance adjuster, may be contacting them.432 The Court noted that
there are ample alternative means for citizens to find out about the
availability of legal services during the thirty-day period.433  Since
lawyers have a great deal of leeway with respect to television, radio,
newspaper and Yellow Page advertisement, the majority observed, there
is little chance that an interested individual will be unable to get
information about legal services.434
Justice Kennedy's dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter and Ginsburg, criticized the majority for failing to give enough
weight to the importance that legal services may have to a someone
immediately after an accident. 435 The dissent remarked that it "makes
little sense" that opposing counsel, investigators and adjustors are free
to contact the unrepresented persons, but lawyers who seek to represent
them are not.436  Justice Kennedy also criticized the majority's
430 Id.
431 Id.
432 Id. (stating respondents argument would have more weight if the rule was not
limited to a brief period and if there were not many other ways for injured Floridiansto learn
about the availability of legal representation during that time).
43' Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380 (noting it found "[nlo basis to question the
common sense conclusion that the many alternative channels for communicating necessary
information about attorneys are sufficient..
434 Id. at 2380-81.
411 Id. at 2381 (stating that the majority ruling undermines attorneys' protected
speech rights under the Constitution "at the expense of those victims most in need of legal
assistance").
288 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
downplaying of the protection accorded to commercial speech, noting
that "so-called commercial speech has become an essential part of the
public discourse the First Amendment secures. '
The dissent maintained that Shapero was controlling with
respect to determining whether the state's interest in prohibiting the
direct mailing was substantial under the first part of the Central Hudson
test.43 In Shapero, Kennedy explained, the Court found no dangers of
overreaching or undue influence because the direct-mail mode of
communication did not implicate serious privacy interests or increase
the likelihood that lawyers would exploit any susceptibility of the
recipient to undue influence.439 The same rationale applied to the
Florida rule, Kennedy suggested.44 Since the Court has frequently held
that restrictions on speech may not be justified on the ground that the
expression offends the listener, and since the right to use.the mail is
clearly protected by the First Amendment, the government cannot "shut
off the flow of mailings to protect those recipientswho might potentially
be offended."44'
Kennedy also challenged the majority's finding that the state had
substantial interest in protecting the dignity and reputation of the legal
436 Id. at 2382.
437 Id.
43 Florida' Bar,'l 15 S.Ct''at 2382. The first part of the Central Hudson test is
whether the state has a substantial interest in implementing a speech restriction. See id.
However, the dissent in Florida Bar noted its recent Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n ruling
that dangers are not presented to victims with direct mail advertising, which is what Florida
Bar involved. Id. Moreover, direct mail solicitation in Shapero did not justify regulating
speech, and the majority was trying to "avoid" the controlling effect of Shapero by saying
"a different privacy interest is implicated." Id.
... Id. at 2382 (noting direct solicitations by mail "can readily be put in a drawer
to be considered later, ignored, or discarded") (citations omitted).
440 Id. at 2383. Justice Kennedy noted that people in households who receive
mailings "are not captive audiences" and all they need to do with mailings they find
objectionable is to throw them in the garbage. Id.
4 Id. at 2383 (citations omitted).
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profession'1 2 Kennedy also stated that, by concluding that disrespect for
the profession results from direct-mail solicitations, the majority
assumed that such solicitation constitutes an unethical or improper
practice, ' ignoring the fact that direct-mail solicitation may "serve vital
purposes and promote the administration of justice." '443
In addition, the dissent maintained that the state had not met its
burden of demonstrating the reality of the asserted harm under the
second prong of Central Hudson.444 Kennedy found that the evidence
the State offered fell "well short of demonstrating that the harms it is
trying to redress are real, let alone that the regulation directly and
materially advances the State's interests." '445 Kennedy noted that the
document prepared by the Florida Bar contained no actual surveys, few
specifics about methodology and no description of the statistical
universe or scientific framework used.446 Furthermore, since the
"selective synopses of invalidated studies" dealt primarily with
television and radio advertising and not direct-mail solicitation, they
offered little support for the state's claim that the ban "materially
advances the elimination of a real harm. 447
Finally, Kennedy declaredthat even if the State's interests were
sufficient under prongs one and two of Central Hudson, the means-ends
fit was not reasonable under prong three. 48 The ban was too broad,
442 Id. "[Tihe mere possibility that some members of the population might find
advertising ...offensive cannot justify suppressing it. The same must hold true for
advertising that some members of the bar might find beneath their dignity." Id.
14' Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2383.
. 44Id. at 2383-84 (explaining the second part of the Central Hudson test "requires
that the dangers the state seeks to eliminate be real and that a speech restriction or ban
advance that asserted state interest in a direct and material way").
445 Id. at 2384.
446 Id.
4I Id. (criticizing that the majority opinion, which declared that empirical data
need not be accompanied by a surfeit of background information, and that anecdotal
evidence can often be sufficient).
... Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2384.
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Kennedy explained, because it applied with respect to all accidental
injuries, whatever their gravity.449 Furthermore, such a broad ban
assumes that in all or most cases, an attorney's advice would be
unwelcome or unnecessary.45 ° Many victims must at once begin
assessing their legal and financial positions, Kennedy pointed out, and
the ban might prevent some victims from knowing that an attorney
would be interested enough to help them.451 Although the majority
countered that there are other means of communicating this information,
that argument "concedes the necessity for the very representation that
the attorneys solicit and the State seeks to ban."452 Therefore, the dissent
concluded that the direct-mail solicitation at issue in this case should be
constitutionally protected.453
The decision in Florida Bar was a notabie exception to the clear
tendency of the Court in 1994-95 to rule against restrictions on free
expression 454 Indeed, the Court struck down such restrictions in each of
the cases in which they arose in this term except for Florida Bar,
including the commercial speech issue in Rubin.4 5 While it may be
449 Id.
450 Id. at 2385.
451 Id.
452 Id.
41' Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2386.
454 See Lebronv. Nat'l R.R. PassengerCorp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995); U.S. v. Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995);
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338
(1995).
... The Court struck down restrictions on freedom of expression i6 several cases
in the 1994-95 court year. Those cases were: Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 961 (holding that Amtrak
Railroad's refusal to display an advertisement may violate the First Amendment, because
where the government creates a corporation by special law and retains for itself permanent
authorityto appoint a majority of that corporation's directors, the corporation is part of the
government under First Amendment analysis); Nat'l Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1003 (holding
that an amended Ethics in GovernmentAct of 1978, § 501(b), violated the First Amendment
because it prohibited members of Congress, federal officers, and other government
employees from accepting honoraria for making appearances, giving speeches, or writing
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premature to suggest that a definite lawyers' speech exception has
developed in the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence, it appears at
the very least that the Court majority will carefully consider and accord
real weight to rationales justifying limits on targeted solicitation by
attorneys as in Florida Bar.456
B. Other Cases Raising Free Expression-related Issues
1. Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation,457 the
Court ruled that the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak),
as a corporation created by special law for the furtherance of
governmental objectives and with a majority of its board appointed by
the President of the United States, is a part of the federal government for
purposes of the First Amendment.458
The petitioner, Michael Lebron, sought to display a political
message on the "colossal" billboard in Amtrak's Pennsylvania Station in
New York City.459 Under the terms of the contract that Lebron signed
with Amtrak's advertising management company, Lebron was required
articles); McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1511 (holding that Ohio's statutory prohibition of the
distributionof anonymous campaign literature violates the First Amendment); Rubin, 115
S. Ct. at 1585 (holding an act that prohibits the displaying of alcohol content on beer labels,
§ 5(e)(2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, violated the First Amendment); and
Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2338 (holding that a requirement that allows a parade to take place,
contingent on expressing a message that is not of the private organizer's own choosing,
violates the First Amendment).
456 Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2381. The Court was persuaded by the Florida Bar's
"substantial interest both in protecting injured Floridians from invasive conduct by lawyers
and in preventing the erosion of confidence in the profession that such repeated invasions
have engendered." Id
411 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995).
451 Id. at 972.
459 Id. at 963.
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to submit his planned billboard designed for approval.46 ° The
advertisementwhich featured a photomontage and the caption, "Is it the
Right Beer Now?" was a critique of the Coors family for its support of
right-wing causes, particularly the Contras in Nicaragua.46" ' Amtrak's
vice-president disapproved of the advertisement, invoking Amtrak's
policy of not displaying political advertisements on the billboard.462
Lebron then filed suit against Amtrak and its management
company, claiming that the refusal to display his advertisement violated
his First and Fifth Amendment rights.463 The District Court ruled that
because of Amtrak's close ties with the federal government, Amtrak was
a government actor for First Amendment purposes"64 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,465 noting that Amtrak
was not a government entity by the terms of the statute that created it,
and concluding that the federal government was not so involved with
Amtrak that Amtrak's actions could be considered federal action.466
The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 opinion authored by Justice
Scalia, first discussed the propriety of reaching the argument that
Amtrak is a government actor.467 The Court noted that Lebron had not
raised that point in the case below and indeed had expressly disavowed
it, arguing instead that Amtrak, although a private entity, was subject to
constitutional consideration because of its close connections to the
federal government.46 It was not until Lebron's brief on the merits
before the Supreme Court that he specifically argues that Amtrak was
460 Id.
461 Id. at 964.
462 Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 964.
463 Id.
464 Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK), 811 F.Supp. 993
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
465 Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK), 12 F.3d 388, 389 (2d
Cir. 1993).
466 Id. at 392.
467 See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 964.
468 Id.
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itself a federal entity.46 9 The Court held that Lebron was not raising a
new claim, but rather was making a new argument to support his original
claim that Amtrak was bound by the First Amendment.47 °
In finding that Amtrak is a government entity for First
Amendment purposesY the Court began by reviewing the structure and
history of Amtrak.472 The Court noted that the statute that created
Amtrak, the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, stated that its
purpose was toimprove public convenience and necessity,4 74 and that
"Congress established Amtrak in order to avert the threatened extinction
of passengertrain service in the United States. 1 7' The Act provides that
Amtrak shall have a board of nine members,4 76 three of whom are
appointed directly by the President of the United States.4 77 The holders
of Amtrak's preferred stock select two board members and since the
469 Id.
470 115S. Ct. at 965. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor maintained that the question
of whether Amtrak is a government entity was not encompassed within the certiorari
petition, and suggested that on the question of whether the actions of Amtrak, "a concededly
private entity," are neverthelessattributableto the federal government because of their close
ties, the answer was no because Amtrak's decision to reject Lebron's billboard proposal was
a matter of private business judgment and not of government coercion or influence. Id. at
975. Justice O'Connor also criticized any type of public/private interdependence analysis
for determining state action, stating that "given the pervasive role of Government in our
society, a test of state action predicated upon ... interdependence sweeps much too broadly
and would subject to constitutional challenge the most pedestrian of everyday activities."
Id. at 980. The majority did not reach that difficult question in light of its determination that
Amtrak was itself a government actor. Id. at 972.
471 Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 972.
472 Id. at 967-70.
113 Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1327 (1970). The Act was
intended "[t]o provide financial assistance and establishment of a national rail passenger
system, to provide for modernizationof railroad passenger equipment, [and] to authorize the
prescribing of minimum standards for railroad passenger service .... Id.
474 Id.
47' Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 967.
476 Rail Passenger Service Act, 45 U.S.C. § 543(a)(1)(3) (1988).
477 Id.
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United States holds all such stock, the Secretary of Transportationmakes
these two selections.478 The eight members then select the ninth
member, the chairperson.479 The government subsidizes Amtrak's
perennial losses, and the Act requires that Amtrak submit various annual
reports to the President and Congress. 480
The Court described the long history of government-createdand
government-controlled corporations, noting that by the end of World
War II, Congress sought to bring the large proliferation of government
corporations under control.481 Congress passed the Government
Corporation Control Act of 1945,482 which required specified
corporations to submit annual budget reports and to be audited by the
Comptroller General. 483  Unlike several other government-created
corporations like the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") and the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting ("CPB"), 4 the Court noted that
"[Amtrak] has been added to the list of corporations covered by the
GCCA, 31 U.S.C. [sec.] 9101 (1988 ed. and Supp. V). 485
The Court dismissed Amtrak's claim that its charter's disclaimer
of government agency status in 45 U.S.C. section 541 prevented it from
being considered a government entity for constitutional purposes 486 The
411 Id. at 968.
49 Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 968.
480 Id.
411 Id. at 969-70.
482 Government Corporation Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 597 (1945). The Act was passed
"[t]o provide for financial control of government corporations." Id.
483 Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 970.
484 Id. at 968, 970 (discussing the history of government corporations, with the
creation of Amtrak, LSC and CPB as variations of the "COMSTAT" corporate "model"
which allowed the government to act unhindered, entering the private sector with
government-conferred advantages and somewhat private shareholder control).
485 Id.
486 45 U.S.C. § 541 established the National Railroad Passenger Corporation as a
for profit corporation. The Corporation's purpose is to "fully develop the potential of
modem rail service in meeting the Nation's inter-city and commuter passenger transportation
requirements." Id. The section further states that"[t]he Corporation will not be an agency
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Court held that section 541 couldbe dispositive of "Amtrak's status for
purposes that are within Congress' control. '"4 7 For example, "the statute
deprives Amtrak of sovereign immunity."88 The Court ruled, however,
that it is not for Congress to determine Amtrak's status with respect to
the constitutional rights of citizens, because "[i]f Amtrak is, by its very
nature, what the Constitution regards as the Government, congressional
pronouncement that it is not such can[not] relieve it of its First
Amendment restrictions ...""'
The Court distinguished two earlier cases in which it had
characterized Amtrak as a nongovernmental entity. ° In National
Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Boston & Maine Corp.,49' the Court
described Amtrak as "not an agency or instrumentality of the United
States Government. 492 Since the "governmental or non-governmental
nature of the Amtrak had no conceivable relevance to the issues before
the Court" in that case, the Court explained, the language was not more
than weak dictum. 493 , Similarly, although the Court acknowledged that
Amtrak's governmental status was marginally relevant in National
Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Atchison,494 "the effect of the
apparent reliance upon Amtrak's nongovernmental character was "at
most to enable the Court to make later in the opinion.. .[a] superfluous
argument. '"'49
or establishment of the United States Government." Id.
487 Id.
488 Id.
489 Id. at 97 1.
490 Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 971.
491 503 U.S. 407 (1992).
492 Id. at 410.
493 Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 97 1.
494 470 U.S. 451 (1985).
49' Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 972. The Court also distinguished Regional Rail
Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974), where the Court held that the "Consolidated
Rail Corporationat Conrail was not federal instrumentaliy, despite the President's power to
appoint.., eight of its fifteen directors." Regional Rail, 419 U.S. at 152 n.40.
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In the absence of applicable precedent to the contrary, the Court
concluded that Amtrak was part of the government for First Amendment
purposes.4 96 Where "government creates a corporation by special law,
for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself
permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors . . . the
corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First
Amendment." '497 The Court warned that "[ilt surely cannot be that the
government, state or federal, is able to evade the most solemn
obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply resorting to the
corporate form."'49 "Amtrak is not merely in the temporary control of
the government ... [but rather] it is established and organized under
federal law" for the purpose of pursuing federal governmental objectives
"under the direction and control of federal governmental appointees. 4 99
Based on its holding, the Court remanded for a determination of whether
Amtrak's action violated the First Amendment on the merits."°
Particularly in light of the increase in recent years of
govemrnment-createdcorporationsto carry out government objectives, 50 1
the decision in Lebron sends a clear and important signal that the
requirementsof the First Amendment and other constitutional provisions
protecting individual rights cannot be circumvented by "resorting to
corporate form. 50 2 At the same time, however, Lebron does not resolve
the question of the applicabilityof the First Amendment to truly private
corporations closely interacting and interdependent with the
46 Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 972.
- Id. at 974-75.
491 Id. at 973.
499 Id. at 973-74.
'00 Id. at 975.
501 See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An
Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94
MICH. L. REV. 302, 312 (1995)(describing governmentally created corporations as "simply
a means of securing governmental objectives").
5"2 Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 973.
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government." 3 Lebron also leaves open which government-created
corporations are subject to the First Amendment." 4 While Lebron
suggests, for example, that Comstat would not be so subject because its
directors are not appointed by the government and it is not subject to the
Government Corporation Control Act, what about LSC, which is not
subject to the Act but was created by and has a board of directors
controlled by the government?. 5 The other specific criterion relied
upon in Lebron to determine whether the corporation was created for the
furtherance of governmental objectives may sometimes be
inconclusive." 6 Fact-specific analysis in future cases involving
government corporations may be necessary to provide an answer."7
'0' Id. at 975.
" See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventingthe Government Corporation,
1995 U. ILL L. REv. 543, 595 (1995).
Entrusting federal responsibilities, or even just
federal money, to corporations subject to varying
degrees of presidential and congressional control
raises difficult question of constitutional and
administrative law, such as when the corporation's
action should be characterizedas federal action, and
whether the corporation must observe First
Amendment, due process, and other restrictions in
its dealings with the public. id.
505 See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 970 (noting that the LSC charter designates it not to
be an agency or instrumentalityof the government); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2996d(e)(l) (West 1995)
(mandating that officers of the LSC are not officers of the federal government).
506 Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 974-75 (holding that a corporation is part of the
government for First Amendment purposes where the "[g]overnmentcreates the corporation
by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself
permanent authority to appoint a majority of the corporation's directors... ").
'°'See Krotoszynski,supra note 501, at 324 (noting that if the Supreme Court had
not abandoned its contacts analysis in Lebron, Amtrak might have been considered a state
actor).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
2. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.
In UnitedStates v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,5"the Supreme Court,
in a 7-2 opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld the Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977509 against the First
Amendment challenge by interpreting the statutes to include a scienter
requirement for all the relevant elements of the offense, and therefore
eliminating the need for a ruling on the constitutional issue.51° The
Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which ruled the law unconstitutional because it did not contain
the requisite scienter requirement.5 '
The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of
1977, as amended, prohibits the interstate transportation or distribution
of materials depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.'1 2
The relevant portion of the state provides that:
(a) Any person who:
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate
or foreign commerce by any means including
by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if:
(A) the producing of such visual depiction
involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any
visual depiction that has been mailed, or has
been shipped or transported in interstate or
50 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
509 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (West 1984).
"'X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 466.
5' Id. at 466-67.
512 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (West 1984).
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foreign commerce, or which contains materials
which have been mailed or so shipped or
transported, by any means including by
computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual
depiction for distribution interstate or foreign
commerce or through the mails, if:
[subsections 2(A) and 2(B) are identical to
I(A) and I(B)] . . . . shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b) of this section." 3
During the course of a sting operation, Rubin Gottesman, owner
and operator of X-Citement Video, Inc., was caught selling and shipping
pornographic films featuring an actress known to be under the age of
eighteen." 4 In reviewing Gottesman's conviction, the Ninth Circuit
interpreted various Supreme Court cases to require that, with
pornography-related convictions such as this, the defendant must have
knowledge at least of the nature and character of the materials. 5
Therefore, the Court held that the First Amendment required that the
defendant possess knowledge that the performer was a minor." 6 Since
the Court found that the statute did not have such a requirement, it
reversed the conviction." 7
The Supreme Court found that the crucial issue in the case was
the determination of whether the term "knowingly" in subsections (1)
and (2) modifies the phrase "the use of a minor" in subsection 1 (A) and
2(A), or whether the Ninth Circuit correctly held that "knowingly"
modified only the surrounding verbs: transports, ships, receives,
distributes, or reproduces5t Although the Court acknowledged that the
513 Id.
514X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 466.
5 United States v. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d 1285, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1992).
516 Id. at 1291-92.
517 Id. at 1290-91.
518 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 467.
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reading of the statute adopted by the Ninth Circuit was "the most natural
grammatical reading," the Court also noted that "anomalies" might result
from that construction, and "that a statute is to be construed where fairly
possible so as to avoid substantial constitutional questions." 9
The Court commented that the most grammatical reading of the
statute would mean that Congress intended to distinguish only between
those who knowingly or unknowingly transported material, regardless
of their knowledge that what they were transporting contained
pornography 2° Thus, the Court explained, those totally unaware of the
sexually explicit nature of what they were dealing with, such as a retail
druggist returning an uninspected roll of film to a customer, would be
criminally liable if it were later discovered that the film contained
prohibited material. 2 ' The Court declared that it was unwilling to
assume that Congress intended such a result. 22
Furthermore, the Court noted that criminal statutes are often
interpreted to include "broadly applicable scienter requirements, even
where the statute by its terms does not contain them." ' The Court cited
its opinion in Morissette v. United States"2 for the principle that there is
a presumption of a scienter requirement in criminal statutes. 25
Morissette involved a statute which punished anyone who
"knowingly converts" property of the United States. 26 The Court




522 Id. at 468. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens stated that the common sense,
if not grammatically correct way to read the subsection, would be to treat "knowingly" as
modifyingeach of the elementsof the offense identified in the remainder of the subsection,
and that to accept the more grammatical reading would be "ridiculous." Id. at 472.
523 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 468.
524 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
525 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 468 (noting that past cases have interpreted
criminal statutes to include a scienter requirement).
526 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1994); see Morissette, 342 U.S. at 248 n.2.
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in that case might have suggested that it applied only to "convert," the
Court used the "background presumption of evil intent" to find that the
terms also required that the defendant know that the property belonged
to the United States.
The Court also cited its more recent holdings in Liparota v.
United States52 and Staples v. United States529 for the proposition that,
absent an express contrary intent, there is a "presumption in favor of a
scienter requirement ... [that] appl[ies] to each of the statutory elements
which criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.""53 Age of minority in
section 2252 is one of those elemental facts, the Court held, because
"non-obscene, sexually explicit materials involving persons of the age
of 17 are protected by the First Amendment."53'
After reviewing the legislative history of the statute, the Court
concluded that "Congress intended that the term 'knowingly' apply to the
requirement that the depiction be of [a] sexually explicit" nature.532
Although the Court found the record to be less clear on whether
Congress intended a scienter requirement to attach to the age of the
performers, it nevertheless held that "as a matter of grammar" it would
be "difficult to conclude that the word 'knowingly' modifies one of the
elements in 1 (A) and 2(A), but not the other." '533 In addition, the Court
noted that one of the canons of statutory constructions is that the Court
527 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 468.
528 471 U.S. 419 (1985). In Liparota, a federal statute prohibiting certain actions
with respect to food stamps had language which could have been read so that the word
"knowingly" modified only "uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses," or could have
been read also to modify "in any manner not authorized by [the statute]." Id. at 424. The
Court held that the scienter requirement applied to both elements." Id. at 424, 433.
529 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994) (holding that a defendant must know that his weapon
possessed automatic firing capability so as to make it a machine gun as defined by the
National Firearms Act, despite the absence of express language in the provision imposing
any mens rea requirement).
530 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 469.
531 Id.
532 Id. at 47 1.
131 Id. at 472.
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should construe statutes so as to avoid constitutional questions where
fairly possible.534 Since a statute "completely bereft of a scienter
requirement as to the age of the performers would raise serious
constitutional doubts," the Court chose to "conclude that the term
'knowingly' in section 2252 extends both to the sexually explicit nature
of the work and to the age of the performers. '"5 35 Therefore, the Court
reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the respondents'
convictions. 3
6
Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justice Thomas, strongly
criticized the majority's construction of the statute, calling the Court's
opinion "without antedecedent6 37 Scalia challenged the Court's use of
prior cases for support of its opinion.5 38 He distinguished Morissette,
Liparota and Staples by noting that those cases involved statutes that
either said nothing about the matter of scienter, or had language about
scienter which was ambiguous, whereas the statute at issue had no such
ambiguity.539 Scalia also contested the Court's finding that a statute
without a scienter requirement with respect to the age of the performers
would raise serious constitutional concerns.54 ° What was involved in
this statute was, according to Scalia, not merely pornography but fully
proscribable obscenity, and constitutionally protected activity will not
534 Id.
... X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 467-69.
36 Id. The Court also rejected the respondents' argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2252
was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it set the age of majority at 18, rather
than 16 as did the New York statute upheld in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), and
because Congress replaced the term "lewd" with the term "lascivious" in defining illegal
exhibition of children's genitalia. Id. The Court declined to reach the respondents'argument
that their indictment was fatally defective because it did not contain a scienter requirement
on the age of majority. Id.
117 Id. at 473.
... Id. Justice Scalia, dissenting from the majority, pointed out that "[n]one of
these decisions cited [by the majority] as authority support interpreting an explicit statutory
scienter requirement in a manner that its language simply will not bear." Id.
5
39 Id.
40 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 473-74.
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be deterred by holding purveyors of this low-value speech absolutely
liable for supporting the exploitation of minors."' Scalia declared,
however, that the statute is nevertheless unconstitutional because it
imposes criminal liability upon those not knowingly dealing in
pornography, and establishes a severe deterrent, not narrowly tailored to
its purposes, upon fully protected First Amendment activities. 42
Although the Supreme Court had already upheld the
constitutionality of statutes prohibiting the distribution of sexually
explicit materials featuring minors in Ferber,54 3 the Court's opinion in X-
Citement Video is noteworthy for its statement that a statute without a
scienter requirement with respect to age would raise serious
constitutional doubts.5" Therefore, although the Court was able to
uphold these particular respondents' convictions, it has tightened up the
requirements for future convictions under the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act and deterred the broadening of statutes
of this type.545
3. United States v. Aguilar
In United States v. Aguilar,546 the Supreme Court was called
upon to review the conviction of United States District Court Judge
Robert Aguilar for illegally disclosing a wiretap in violation of Title 18
41 Id. at 475.
542 Id.
14' Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 (upholding section 263 of New York's Penal Law as
constitutional for penalizing the use of a child in a sexual performance).
144 X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 472.
141 Id. The Court in X-Citement Video concluded that the term "knowingly" in the
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §
2252, applied to both the sexually explicit nature of the material and to the age of the
performers, instead of only to the former, as argued by the Ninth Circuit. Id.
546 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995).
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of the United States Code, section 2232(c),547 and endeavoring to
obstruct the administration of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. section
1503.54 Specifically, the Court was to determine whether exposing an
expired wiretap violates section 2232(c), and whether section 1503
punishes false statements made to potential grand jury witnesses. 49
One particular aspect of Aguilar related to First Amendment
issues. An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed Aguilar's
conviction under section 2232(c) because the wiretap revealed by
Aguilar was not pending at the time of disclosure and, according to the
Court, the wiretap application of authorization must be pending to be
ccvered by the statute.5!" The Supreme Court voted 8-1 to uphold
Aguilar's conviction under section 2232(c), rejecting the Court of
Appeal's reasoning that since the wiretap was no longer in place at the
... This section of the statute provides:
Whoever, having knowledge that a Federal
investigative or law enforcement officer has been
authorized or has applied for authorization under
chapter 119 to intercept a wire, 'oral, or electronic
communication, in order to obstruct, impede, or
prevent such interception, gives notice or attempts
to give notice of the possible interception to any
person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more that five years, or both. 18 U.S.C. §
2232(c) (1995).
... This clause provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever... corruptly or by threats or force, or by
any threatening letter or communication,
influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to
influence, obstruct, or impede, the due
administration of justice, shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both. Id.
... Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. at 2360.
550 U.S. v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1480 (1994). The Court of Appeals argued that
since "the purpose of the statute is to prevent interferencewith 'possible interception,"' there
is not "possible interception" once a wiretap has expired or been denied. Id.
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time of the disclosure, Aguilar could not be convicted."' The Court held
that the impossibility of any interception at the time of Aguilar's
disclosure did not make the offense any less complete. 52
In defense of the section 2232(c) charge, Aguilar also argued
that disclosure of expired wiretaps should be excluded from the statute's
coverage, because a broader construction would violate the First
Amendment. 53 The Court rejected this argument unanimously.554
Although the Court affirmed that "the government may not generally
restrict individuals from disclosing information that lawfully comes into
their hands" without a powerful state interest at stake, the Court noted
that "the statute in question only prohibited disclosure made 'in order to
instruct [sic], impede or prevent' the interception." '555 In addition, the
Court noted that the respondent was not merely an uninvolved member
of the public who happened to lawfully come across information.556
Rather he was a federal judge who was given the information by another
federal judge for the specific purpose of preserving the court's
integrity. 57 Government officials in sensitive confidential positions at
times may have special duties of nondisclosure.5" As to one who
voluntarily assumes a duty of confidentiality, governmental restrictions
on disclosure are not subject to the same stringent standards that would
apply "to efforts to impose restrictions on unwilling members of the
"' Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. at 2365.
5512 Id. at 2364. The Court argued that section 2232(c) was "aimed at disclosure of
wiretap orders or application which may lead to interceptions" and that "[t]he offense is
complete at the time the notice is given, when it often cannot be known whether any
interception will take place." Id.
113 Id. at 2365.
55 Id. The Court rejected respondent's First Amendment argument that section
2232(c) did not impose a general restriction on the public from disclosing information in the
absence of a high state interest, but instead "upon those who disclose wiretap information
'in order to instruct, impede, or prevent' the interception." Id
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public."" 9 In this case, the government's interest was strong enough to
justify construction of the statute as written, without any artificial
narrowing because of First Amendment concerns. 6
... Id. See also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
160 Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. at 2365.
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